Article: The Arrogance of Power

The Arrogance of Power from Campus Progress
Reprinted with permission
By Todd Hill
Apr 8th, 2005

On Wednesday before the House Armed Services Committee, there was a 2nd showdown between former 4-star NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark, and chief Bush neocon Richard Perle, over the War in Iraq. These two individuals had an infamous showdown in 2002 in the ramp up to war before this same House committee. In their first encounter, Clark’s analysis of the impending conflict was full of warning signs to avoid a miscalculated detour from the war on terror, and should instead allow diplomacy to run its course.

“War should be an absolute last resort option,” Clark often repeated during his 2002 testimony. Perle and the many Republican committee members sarcastically mocked Clark then, but they turned face and attacked Richard Perle this time around. Walter Jones Jr, the conservative Republican from North Carolina, set crosshairs on Richard Perle, asking a number of times for “someone to apologize for the misinformation given.” Jones even went so far as to go into great detail of attending various military funerals throughout his district, often amplifying his tone and glaring at the Pentagon war hawk.

General Clark, in a noted exchange with chairman Duncan Hunter (R-CA), reminded the congressman that "I kept saying time was on our side," and "I could never quite satisfy you." It was quite clear during Wednesday’s testimony that the neoconservative Richard Perle had no intention in apologizing for his miscalculations, or apologizing on behalf of anyone within the administration. He was not humble, nor was he conciliatory. Am I surprised? Absolutely not, as Harry Reid said perfectly, it's that "arrogance of power" that Republicans hold.

Without a doubt there were very few individuals who stood up in those months after September 11th when it was clear that the ship was turning towards a conflict with Iraq. Men like Howard Dean, Bob Graham, and General Clark warned anyone who would listen that this was the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time. Now we are stuck in a never ending cycle of guerilla war, we’ve lost complete concentration and choked off vital resources toward the war on terror, our military is overextended and unable to quickly react to any new and impending national security issues, and the crippling debt we are incurring will serve to remind us for generations of the miscalculations that Richard Perle and the rest of his neoconservative brethren have cost the United States of America in vital economic and Foreign policy credibility.

As General Wesley Clark stated at the end of his testimony on Wednesday, "I'll let the record speak for itself."

Article: Same Committee, Same Combatants, Different Tune

Reprinted with permission. By Dana Milbank Washington Post April 7, 2005; Page A10
Rep. Walter B. Jones Jr. is a conservative Republican from North Carolina who voted to authorize the use of force in Iraq. So it jarred all the more yesterday when Jones turned his fury on Richard N. Perle, the Pentagon adviser who provided the Bush administration with brainpower for the Iraq war.
Jones, who said he has signed more than 900 condolence letters to kin of fallen soldiers, pronounced himself "incensed" with Perle. "It is just amazing to me how we as a Congress were told we had to remove this man . . . but the reason we were given was not accurate," Jones told Perle at a House Armed Services Committee hearing. Jones said the administration should "apologize for the misinformation that was given. To me there should be somebody who is large enough to say 'We've made a mistake.' I've not heard that yet."
As chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, Perle had gone before the same committee in 2002 and smugly portrayed retired Army Gen. Wesley K. Clark, who urged caution in Iraq, as "hopelessly confused" and spouting "fuzzy stuff" and "dumb cliches."
Thirty months and one war later, Perle and Clark returned to the committee yesterday. But this time lawmakers on both sides hectored Perle, while Clark didn't bother to suppress an "I told you so."
Perle wasn't about to provide the apology Jones sought. He disavowed any responsibility for his confident prewar assertions about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, heaping the blame instead on "appalling incompetence" at the CIA. "There is reason to believe that we were sucked into an ill-conceived initial attack aimed at Saddam himself by double agents planted by the regime. And as we now know the estimate of Saddam's stockpile of weapons of mass destruction was substantially wrong."
Jones, nearly in tears as he held up Perle's testimony, glared at the witness. "I went to a Marine's funeral who left a wife and three children, twins he never saw, and I'll tell you, I apologize, Mr. Chairman, but I am just incensed with this statement."
Clark, an unsuccessful 2004 Democratic presidential candidate, could not resist piling on Perle. Intelligence estimates "are never accurate, they are never going to be accurate, and I think policymakers bear responsibility for what use they make of intelligence," the retired general lectured.
Sometimes life imitates art. Yesterday, it imitated an episode of "Crossfire." For more than three hours, Clark and Perle reprised their confrontation before the committee in September 2002. The two men entered in twin gray suits and red ties, and took adjacent chairs at the witness table. Clark scribbled in pencil, Perle with a fountain pen. Only Perle's reading material -- he put on the witness table a copy of "Kitchen Confidential: Adventures in the Culinary Underbelly" -- suggested he was not expecting what was to come.
Perle opened by acknowledging mistakes -- though not his own. "The occupation of Iraq did much to vitiate the goodwill we earned," he said, and, "The grand ambition of the Coalition Provisional Authority was profoundly mistaken."
The two belligerents then went after each other, taking the hearing out of the control of the lawmakers. Perle wondered "why in the world" Clark would talk to Syria. Clark said Perle should learn to "eat the elephant one bite at a time." "What are you talking about?" Perle demanded.
Finally, Rep. Victor F. Snyder (D-Ark.) tried to regain the floor. "It is illegal to fight dogs in Arkansas," he said. "I'm not going to get in the middle."
Democrats lobbed softballs to Clark and fired darts at Perle, who made little effort to ingratiate himself, calling one questioner "careless" and saying another cited "substantially incorrect accounts."
"You need a few more allies," observed Rep. Mark Udall (D-Colo.).
It was not always thus. At the September 2002 hearing, GOP lawmakers joined in Perle's dismissal of Clark's argument that "time is on our side" in Iraq and that force should be used only as a "last resort."
Perle said Clark was "wildly optimistic" and called it "one of the dumber cliches, frankly, to say that force must always be a last resort." While Clark fiddled, "Saddam Hussein is busy perfecting those weapons of mass destruction that he already has."
In retrospect, Clark's forecasts proved more accurate than Perle's, and even Republicans on the committee made little effort yesterday to defend Perle or to undermine Clark. The exception was Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), who pressed Clark to acknowledge that the Iraq invasion should get some credit for signs of democracy in the region.
"We've got to do a lot less crowing about the sunrise," Clark rejoined.
When Hunter's GOP colleagues didn't join his line of questioning, he took another turn grilling Clark. The chairman likened President Bush's Middle East policies to those of President Ronald Reagan in Eastern Europe.
"Reagan never invaded Eastern Europe," Clark retorted.
In another try, Hunter said Clark was "overstating" the risk in challenging other countries in the Middle East. Clark smiled and showed his trump card -- reminding Hunter of their exchange at the 2002 hearing. "I kept saying time was on our side," Clark said. "I could never quite satisfy you."
As for who proved correct, the general said, "I'll let the record speak for itself."

Introduction and Welcome: Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-CA) and Remarks by Richard Perle

Introduction and Welcome: Chairman Duncan Hunter: (R-CA)

Play Audio

Remarks: Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

Play Audio

Statement of General Wesley K. Clark before the HASC 4/6/05

General Wesley Clark Testifies Before the House Armed Services Committee

April 6, 2005

Statement of General Wesley K. Clark
General Clark also spoke extemporaneously to the Committee. Click the transcript link for the text of his remarks.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, distinguished members of this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

From moment one, this Committee has been strongly supportive of the men and women in uniform, and I want to commend you for that -- and thank you for the support that so many of you gave to me during my time in the military. As a former soldier, I can’t stress enough how important these deliberations are to our armed forces and military families stationed around the world -- and to the thousands of veterans I've met with over the past two years.

I have also heard from thousands of people over the internet who wish to express their gratitude for your efforts and concerns about the situation in Iraq. On their behalf and on behalf of my own family, I thank you.

It is a privilege to appear today to present my thoughts on Iraq and our armed forces, to offer a brief retrospective on the mission there, to sketch out a successful way ahead, and to discuss the implications for the U.S. armed forces.In September 2002, you invited me to testify about the looming crisis in Iraq. At the time, based on the information provided by the U.S. intelligence community, we all believed that Iraq possessed some chemical and biological weapons, and had an ongoing effort to gain nuclear weapons. It made sense at the time to go to the United Nations and get strong diplomatic reinforcement to end Saddam’s weapons programs.

But the critical issue then was how to end Saddam’s weapons program without detracting from our focus on Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network, and our efforts to deal with other immediate, mid- and long-term security problems. As you may recall, I counseled at the time that we needed a Congressional Resolution -- not at that point authorizing the use of force -- but rather expressing the intent to use force if all other measures were to fail. I testified that we should then use this Congressional Resolution to press for UN action, that we should work patiently to forge world-wide legitimacy, and that force should be used only as a last resort, after all diplomatic means had been exhausted -- and then only after we had fully prepared to handle the post-conflict process in Iraq.

After a Congressional Resolution and an aborted U.N. inspection effort, the U.S. invaded Iraq. We did not use the U.N. process effectively to enhance our legitimacy or build our coalition. The Administration did not heed the warnings of General Shinseki and others who warned of the force strength necessary to win the war and win the peace. In short, the Administration did not give our military adequate planning or sufficient resources to handle the post-conflict situation in Iraq. These errors were compounded by weak strategic decisions, including dissolving the Iraqi army and outlawing Baathist participation in new governmental structures. The prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib has provided our enemies with a propaganda bonanza resulting in a recruiting windfall in Iraq and throughout the Arab world.

More fundamentally, with its armed occupation of Iraq, the Administration lost focus, and was substantially distracted from worldwide efforts against Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network are still at large, terrorist incidents have continued to take innocent life, and U.S. military actions in Iraq have provided a magnet for recruiting and training large numbers of extremist youth in continuing warfare. If Iraq is today the center of the war against terrorism, as some in the Administration have contended, it is not because the terrorists were there originally, but because they have been recruited there to the fight against us. Our military action in Iraq is more a catalyst for terrorists than a cure. Whatever results may ultimately come from removing Saddam Hussein from power, ending the terrorist threat against the United States of America is not likely to be one of them.

Of great concern today and, frankly, in the years ahead is that the focus on Iraq has deprived the Administration of the time, diplomatic support, and military resources to act effectively against other, more dangerous sources of WMD proliferation. The "red line" established by the Clinton Administration against North Korea's reprocessing of spent uranium fuel to make plutonium has now been breached. North Korea has announced that they have reprocessed and presumably now have the fissile materials to make at least a half dozen additional nuclear weapons. Furthermore, this Administration has refused to participate in the discussions aimed at persuading Iran to permanently renounce its uranium enrichment capabilities.

From the outset, the military mission in Iraq has been complicated by factors other than making the best decisions for success. Operations to destabilize Iraq were apparently viewed as the start of a broader campaign to destabilize or overthrow a number of governments in the Middle East, including Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Libya, and Sudan. The start of the campaign was rushed, for reasons that have never been made clear by the Administration. And once U.S. forces were inside Iraq, U.S. diplomacy failed to take measures to undercut regional resistance from countries such as Syria and Iran.

If we are to succeed in Iraq, we must move along three tracks; first, improve security and at the same time reduce the exposure and commitment of the U.S. forces; second, strengthen our ability to facilitate Iraqi political development; third, we must reduce regional resistance to the emergence of a democratic Iraq.

On the first track, the U.S. military must shift away from the battlefields and move into more of a reserve role, relying on a cadre of U.S. advisors to strengthen the newly-minted Iraqi forces. This will entail risks, as U.S. forces turn over combat responsibilities, so it must be paced to improved Iraqi capabilities and the development of an advisory structure.

On the second track, our Embassy obviously has to play a behind-the-scenes role. Without usurping Iraqi responsibilities, we should be able to do more to gain local political information, shape alternatives and facilitate the emergence of democratic governance inside Iraq.

On the third track, we should to be talking to all of Iraq's neighbors, including Syria and Iran in a regional framework. Delaying this until we can change the governments in Damascus and Tehran, which seems to be the current policy, puts increasing pressure on our troops and raises the risks inside Iraq.

The U.S. armed forces are caught up in an over-extended ground campaign that is rapidly using up our ground combat strength. In equipment terms, each year in Iraq puts about five years of normal wear-and-tear on the equipment. The wheeled and tracked fleets from the first combat rotation into Iraq have not yet been fully repaired and restored. Reserve component units are leaving much of their equipment behind in Iraq for follow-on units, thereby crippling their recovery and retraining at home.

Even more importantly, the human costs to the all-volunteer Army, especially, have been staggering. The Army currently has 17 brigades deployed in Iraq, from an active force of 33 brigades, which should grow to 44 brigades as the result of internal Army restructuring. Most reserve component brigades have already been called up and deployed. The result is that active duty soldiers can expect to be deployed every other year to Iraq for a year long combat tour, unless either the size of the American commitment to Iraq is reduced or the size of the active force is significantly increased.

And even maintaining the force at its current size is likely to be challenging. While the active force is meeting its retention objectives, recruiting for the Army and Marine Corps is lagging behind both for the active and the reserve component. Ultimately, if the current combat levels in Iraq continue, this recruiting gap is unlikely to be closed by more financial incentives. Most married soldiers just can’t contemplate indefinitely deploying for a year, every other year, away from their families.

Even worse is the treatment that the United States is meting out to its returning reservists, Guardsmen, and other veterans. Over the past three years there has been a substantial erosion of veterans benefits -- hospitals have closed or reduced treatments, usage fees have risen, returning reservists and Guardsmen have lost jobs, had their homes foreclosed on, credit scores ruined, suffered family tragedies, and significant stresses. The adjustment mechanisms to receive home our soldiers and then to sustain them and care for them as a grateful nation should are simply inadequately developed and funded. We owe our veterans -- and we owe their families as a pragmatic matter, if we don';t do more, we'll never be able to raise the forces we need to sustain our commitments.

If we are to sustain the all-volunteer force, and restore our defenses, we will need to augment the size of the active force substantially, fully fund our materiel requirements, enhance the benefits and support for our reserve force, and as both a pragmatic and moral imperative, fully fund the VA and improve our support structure for our veterans.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you again for your support of our troops. I will be pleased to take your questions.

Questions 1-3: Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-CA)

Question 1: Chairman Duncan Hunter: (R-CA)

Summary: Do you agree that the move to multiparty elections in Egypt, Syria withdrawing from Lebanon, Qaddafi renouncing his adversity to the United States or at least turning over a fairly large package of weapons equipment were a result of American action in the region and that were you heartened by that?

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark

I’m very heartened by the continuing efforts of people in the region to reform their governments, and achieve greater liberty and freedom and better treatment of the individual. It’s a long-term process in the Middle East. We’ve seen it swing in cycles in our lifetimes.

Chairman Duncan Hunter interrupts....

I think that America does have enormous influence in the region -- both positive and negative. There have been many ripples of the American action there. I think we’ve got to be very cautious in taking a lot of credit for some of the changes. So far as I know, we had nothing to do with the death of Yassar Arafat. And that’s what’s really opened up the progress with the Palestinians.

Chairman Duncan Hunter interrupts....

I think you’d have to go through each one of them and go through them in detail. But I think that if you’re going to try to, as a single matter, say “We used force, we were tough, we were going in there to free these people and look at the great consequences.” I think you’re giving the United States and our military action too much credit. It’s a very dangerous ....

Chairman Duncan Hunter interrupts....

(crosstalk)

You’re forcing me into a binary answer, I’m trying to give you a real answer. You said we’re both big picture people, let’s be big picture people. Look, what’s happening in the Middle East is a result of many different forces. What we have over there is a lot of people who are very angry at the United States.

They do NOT want democracy by our standards imposed. They have fought for democracy for a long time. They’ll take advantage of the United States, or western Europe or the United Nations or anybody else who can help them. And they’re grateful for that.

But, if we really want to help democracy, we’ve got to do, in this country, we’ve got to do less crowing about the sunrise coming in the Middle East and a lot more behind the scenes to make it work,

For example, in Lebanon, right now, it’s great that the Syrian forces are coming out, but there was an agreement between lots of parties in the region that helped get the Syrian forces in and establish stability. Now what precisely can we do and are we doing to make sure that the withdrawal of Syrian forces is not accompanied in Lebanon by conflict.

That’s where the United States can make a contribution. So US strength is always appreciated., but people in the region, and I just returned from the region, they don’t want the United States to say we’re that imposing democracy on them. I think we shouldn’t be trying to take credit for that.

---

Question 2: Chairman Duncan Hunter: (R-CA)

Summary: Do you think there was any causal link between our activities ...any causal link... between our activities in the two war fighting theatres and those occurrences?
Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark

Mr. Chairman, If I can give you a very simple answer.

I understand your question. And I’m saying that there are many forces in the region, of which US activities are one.

To take the case of Kadafi for example. Kadafi had been under economic sanctions, there was a long-term British- led effort to get him to renounce his policy of terrorism, give up his weapons of mass destruction and come back in.

Did Kadafi then say “Hey we might get invaded?” Maybe he did say that . We don’t know that, but what we do know is that is wasn’t simply the US invasion of Iraq which triggered this. This has long roots.

As far as Lebanon is concerned, if Syria had listened and looked at the United States invading Iraq and had feared that they had to come out of Lebanon as a result, they might have come out right after we invaded Iraq. They didn’t. They came out when Prime Minister Arreri was assassinated as the result of some Syrian intelligence miscalculation that they could knock off the pressure for Syrian independence by having Arreri knocked off. Instead, it backfired. Bashar Assad is not a, he’s not a wise statesman. He’s presiding over a very shaky regime. It’s made shaky by a lot of things, and I’m sure it’s part of our policy to change that regime. So, if US pressure is contributing to that, then we should take some credit for it, but it’s not necessarily the fact that we invaded Iraq.

I don’t want to diminish the significance of what we’re doing, but I do think we have to be careful, because there’s a fundamental difference between what happened in Eastern Europe in 1989 and what’s happening in the Middle East today.

In Eastern Europe, we never invaded. NATO and the United States were there as a beneficent force. Had we gone in and said “Hey, we’re going to start the ball rolling in Eastern Europe. We’re going to knock off the Polish regime so that democracy can spread”, we don’t know what the consequences would have been. But normally people resist it. When you come into their country, kick down their doors and cause trouble.

In the Middle East, we have invaded a country and we’ve been very faithful in our support to Israel, we’ve been part of a lot of conflict in the region and we’ve been blamed for some of that conflict. So my point is, that there is a whole multitude of actions and I give credit to the United States for being strong, having strong values, bringing a lot of people over here for many, many years to be educated and seeing our way of democracy, but to attribute all of what’s happened to the fact that we invaded Iraq? I couldn’t do that.

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

---

Question 3: Chairman Duncan Hunter: (R-CA)

Summary: Our calculations indicate that Congress has increased military benefits and pay extraordinarily over the last few years. Do you have any recommendations going forward to make sure that the DoD intelligence contacts can be handed over to other intelligence agencies as the military footprint recedes in the future so that those DoD intelligence contacts are not squandered.

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark

Well, several...

First, if I could just thank the committee for what it has done for the retirees and the active duty military. I think you have, as you indicated, done a number of things that are in our benefit. I do think that more needs to be done for the Reserve components, for the National Guard to facilitate their transition, and for veterans –perhaps we can discuss that.

With respect to Richard’s comment, if I could just say, I’m very strongly in favor of what the United States can do to help people gain democratic rights and I’ve talked to a number of dissidents across the region. But I think we have to understand both what our powers are and what the limits of our powers are. And we are much more powerful leading by example, than we are by leading by force. And I’m one of those who believes forces should be used as a last resort. It’s caused a lot of backblast for us in the region and I’ll be happy to discuss it depth, in terms of how you use it to promote democracy later.

With respect to DoD intelligence, Mr. Chairman, I’ve always felt that we’ve -- not only in the Middle East, but elsewhere -- not adequately taken advantage of the relationships that we develop, military to military and military to civilian. There’s never been a mechanism for really capturing these up and bottling them. Both in Europe and the Middle East, we have constant relationships and friendships that form and ideas that come in and they just don’t percolate up. And I might say that this is also true of the diplomatic community. When I was on active duty, I got some of my best intelligence by reading the diplomatic cables, rather than by reading the cables brought in by the intelligence community. Because the diplomats DO go in and talk to top-level people, they’re not in the decision-making, but they’re there.

So, if I could suggest a change that somehow, we need a bank, an information repository we need and we could do it with the communications ability we have with the Internet and so forth now, we need to retain to a greater awareness of the people we’re interfacing with around the world than what we’ve done in the past.

Other governments do this, our government doesn’t.

Question 4: Ike Skelton (D-MO)

Question 4: Ranking Member Mr. Ike Skelton (D-MO)

Summary: During WWII there was sacrifice by everyone in the country. Today, though many people understand that we're at war, would you amplify on what you meant when you said that the American people were not behind the war?

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
transcript by RegNYC

Well, what I meant was that in terms of the support that the all-volunteer force needs to go out and gain recruits, you can see the backing away that's going on right now.

After 9/11 there was a wave of patriotism that swept the country, but as the fighting continues in Iraq and we continue to suffer losses and people understand the full consequences of coming in, the military, then the people who are out there doing it are telling me that they're not getting the full support that they'd like to have.

We're not getting the recruits that we used to get in. The Army's missed its shortfall in February, or missed its recruiting objective in February. It's missed it in March. And the Army leadership, as it's reported to me, doesn't believe that this is simply a matter of dollars.

They believe that it's more fundamental than that. That it's not a matter of doubling re-enlistment bonuses or giving more access to schooling, rather that something's shifting, that for whatever reason the way they see it is, people weren't asked to sacrifice, and somehow it's translating now into their difficulties in meeting recruiting objectives.

I think there's still tremendous support and admiration for the men and women in uniform. I think it's a question of whether adequate numbers of people are going to volunteer to serve in uniform.

Questions 5-6: Mr. Roscoe Bartlett (D-MD)

Question 5: Mr. Roscoe Bartlett (D-MD)

Summary: Peter Brooks of the Heritage Foundation made the observation that all the oil producing countries in the world except Saudi are now tapped out. That only Iraq has ability to surge in oil production. Do you think he is correct?
(question summary by incap)
Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
Transcript by Melange

I haven’t done a detailed study of the oil industry in the last couple of years but just from my reading there are still reserves that are out there, it’s a question of price and whether investors believe that the price of oil will stay high enough to justify tapping those reserves. So what we’ve seen in the past is there is significant price elasticity on the supply of oil that if the price stays high we’ll get more oil.

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

---

Question 6: Mr. Roscoe Bartlett (D-MD)

Summary: In the 40’s and 50’s, M.Q. Hubbard predicted peak oil production in 1970’s in US. In 1973, he predicted that world oil production would peak in 2000. Observers now believe peak oil production has occurred. India and particularly China are heavy users. If it is true that the world has reached peak oil production, shouldn’t we be considering the geopolitical ramifications of that?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

Response from General Wesley Clark
Transcript by Melange

If I could just add to that, I think that we do need a wholesale look at the energy policy and its geopolitical ramifications in this country.

We need a comprehensive energy policy that will move us towards less reliance on hydrocarbons that are imported in this country, using renewable energy, emphasizing renewable energy sources, conservation and other energy sources.

We could do a lot and we need to – it’s an important component of national security and our economic well-being in the future.

---

Question 7: Mr. Solomon Ortiz (D-TX)

Question 7: Mr. Solomon Ortiz (D-TX)

Summary:

Is there a better way to protect the Iraqi military/police forces during the recruiting/training process? When will the Iraqis be able to take over?

If 40-45% of the US reserves have been activated and if we leave a large portion of the equipment behind in Iraq, what will happen if we don't have the reserves or the equipment if an attack occurs here at home?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
transcript by Reg NYC

Congressman Ortiz, I think that the answer to the first, the issue of the insecurity in Iraq is something that's got to be dealt with from the top down, starting with the building of the Iraqi government, establishment of legitimacy, the building of the Armed Forces, local police forces, collecting intelligence gathering security.

In the near term, what's happening of course is US Armed Forces are filling in for the need and using the Iraqi forces as they are trained. And I'm sure that there are efforts underway to identify areas and times of specific vulnerability, such as when there's a graduation or crowd gathering. And I'm sure that there are efforts underway or there will be efforts underway, because this is just a function of good leadership on the ground, of assessing your vulnerabilities and developing a plan to protect yourself in those vulnerable areas.

It's a question of what the capacity is of the Iraqis. So, where we are right now in this process as I see it is we're in the risk-taking stage. We're going to re-deploy US forces away from the most intense fighting. We're going to push the Iraqi forces out front to do more and more. We're going to be, I hope, establishing an advisory structure so that there's a linkage between the Iraqi forces on the ground and our ability to reinforce if they hit something they can't handle in a timely fashion. And that will entail risk as we disengage US forces and put the Iraqi forces in. I think it's a risk that we have to take. So, and we know that the insurgency knows this and is targeting the Iraqis. So, we're witnessing the ongoing conflict there.

There's no reason to believe that we can't establish an effective Iraqi security force given time and adequate resources. And we just, as someone who's not part of the administration, I just have to watch it being developed. I know our generals who are doing the training. I have confidence in them. They simply have to ask and demand what they need to get the job done.

At home, we know our Reserve components have given up a lot of equipment, and they've got a substantial recovery mode. And we also know that the retention rate in the National Guard and Reserves is going to be impacted by their tours in Iraq. So, that's why I'm saying we need to fully fund all of our equipment requirements.

The Army needs to lay the bill in front of this committee to replace the equipment that's been left in Iraq. So our Reserve components have it to train with and to operate with. And we need to re-look the incentives and the support structure for our Reserve and National Guardsmen. Some of these are very simple matters. For example, the Arkansas Army National Guard brigade that just returned from Iraq, for some reason these troops were more or less, it was suggested that they take leave in route to Iraq because of transportation delays.

The leave they took was essentially at the convenience of the government, but it was chargeable against their individual leave. So, many of these soldiers are now coming back being de-processed and don't have adequate resources and time available to really transition back into their lives. They don't have any leave left, because they used it up. Surely, we can provide the authority for them to get another two or three weeks leave if it means a higher retention capacity.

There are a lot of issues like this that are specific to individual units that you won't see at this level, but I think what the leadership in the Armed Forces needs is the signal from the Congress that they've got - that the Congress will support the measures required to fully meet the needs of the Reserve component, both for personnel and equipment.

Questions 8-9: Mr. Walter Jones (R-NC)

Question 8: Mr. Walter Jones (R-NC)

Summary: Let me ask you a yes or no question, in 1996 did you and others meet with the newly elected Prime Minister Netanyahu and try to encourage him to go in and remove Saddam Hussein? Were you aware or involved in the policy counter-terrorism evaluation group headed by David Wormser?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

---

Question 9: Mr. Walter Jones (R-NC)

Summary: Many Americans are disappointed and frustrated that the justification for war, the idea that Saddam had WMD's and nuclear weapons, has turned out to be not true. I've taken it on myself to write letters to every American that has lost a loved one in this war. I share their frustration. I am incensed that your statement ( Mr. Perle's statement) could even be allowed to be printed. I wish somebody that would apologize for the misinformation that was given, even though we all make mistakes and it's difficult to get accurate intelligence.
(question summary by incap)

I wish there was somebody large enough to say "We made a mistake. We're there now and we've got to finish the job", but I have not heard that yet.

Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

Question 10: Mr. Ike Skelton (D-MO):

Question 10: Mr. Ike Skelton (D-MO):

Summary: Retired General Jack Kean testified here not long ago that the reason we invaded Iraq was that we were "seduced" into doing so by Iraqi exiles, your comments?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

Response from General Wesley Clark

Mr. Chairman, may I just have a moment, please?

First of all, I'd like to thank Congressman Jones for his remarks, because I think that he expresses the frustrations that so many Americans feel and certainly I did from the beginning.

Of course, I wasn't part of the intelligence community, and I didn't have a need to know during that period. I did testify in front of this committee. But I think Congressman Jones has reminded all of us that we're all held accountable at all times for what we're saying, what we're implying and what we're pushing for.

And with respect to the specific issue of intelligence, we've investigated the intelligence community. We've kicked them in the rear.

Everybody who's ever worked with intelligence knows that you put a wide margin around intelligence estimates. They are never accurate. They're never going to be accurate, and I think policy makers bear a responsibility for what use they make of intelligence.

When I testified in front of this committee in September of 2002, we had a long discussion, Mr. Chairman about whether time was on our side or not. And after I left my friend and colleague warned me that he was going to take apart my statement, and he was one of those who pushed us to move into Iraq in a very rapid fashion.

I think what I'm trying to suggest is that when we're dealing with issues that involve the use of force that we need to be cautious, we need to look for other alternatives, and we need to use force as a last resort.

We need to put a margin around our intelligence, because when you start to commit men and women to combat, the decisions, the results cannot be changed. Lives are lost. It's permanent. It's not correctable.

Those are lessons I learned in my military career, and I think they're lesson that every policy maker has to bear in mind and my concern is that what I'm seeing in the national debate today is a lot of blame on some very honorable, hard working and committed intelligence officers.

Okay, they were wrong, but no one ever said they were always going to be right, and people who are put in policy positions in the high levels of the Armed Forces or elected to positions, who are appointed to positions are expected to exercise judgment.

And that's the accountability that Congressman Long and Congressman Jones and many others in America feel needs to be expressed now.

We haven't had that accountability yet.

Questions 11-12: Mr. Gene Taylor (D-MS)

Question 11: Mr. Gene Taylor (D-MS):

Summary: Mr. Perle, prior to the war vote a lot of the neo-conservatives made a point of saying that this conflict would be paid for by the Iraqi oil revenues. My question to you is how could we have been so far off on that and when do you anticipate we get to a point when those revenues start helping to pay for this huge cost to the American taxpayer?

General Clark, I distinctly remember you coming before the committee and saying, "look we're gonna win but one thing you need to keep in mind is we will be there at least 10 years...."

I remember mentioning this to the president when he was asking for our votes and he kind of dismissed it. It looks like you were pretty close to the mark. Because you were pretty close to the mark on that, where do you think it goes from here?
(question summary by incap)


Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
transcript by Reg NYC

Well, here's where I think we are right now.

I think the military actions are- have been effective. General Casey did the right thing, in my view in shutting down Najaf and Fallujah and all that action that occurred in the fall.

We did a good job of protecting the elections.

I think there's effective training going on, maybe not at the pace we want it to go on, with the Iraqis. And we are going to create an advisory effort. I see no reason why that shouldn't work mechanically, sociologically in the region and in Iraq. It should work. There's no superpower against us. There's no sanctuary out there that's totally, that's difficult for us to work against, as say what we had in Vietnam. So, this is a military operation on the ground which should be winnable.

The real questions in this issue are twofold.

First, what happens in the region and secondly, then what is the impact on Al Qaeda?

What happens in the region is unclear. The Syrians are pulling out of Lebanon. If you're working this and you figure that both Iran and Syria know they're next on the chopping block, then they don't want to see us succeed, and the more pressure we put on and the more we convince them that they have no future, those regimes have no future, the greater the efforts they'll make to stall us in Iraq. So, it's unpredictable in the sense that the more we press against Syria, the more likely it is that Iran is going to use its leverage inside Iraq to complicate our work inside Iraq.

So, we're at the point where we've got our Armed Forces on the ground and pressure can be put against our Armed Forces. For us to have greater strategic maneuver room in the region, we need to be pulling our Armed Forces out, so we've got greater leverage on the situation.

We need to be working to reassure the Syrian regime at the same time we're working to transform and create a greater opening inside Syria. And I believe we need to be working and dialoging with the Iranians, even as we want Iran to have greater respect for Democracy and human rights in its own country.

I see a three to five year period of continued US troop presence in Iraq, a possible mission to stabilize Syria that could come as a result of a catastrophic collapse of the Syrian government and unpredictable consequences with respect to Iran.

I assume that at some point the Iranians will have decided whether or not they're going to press ahead with nuclear weapons, and we'll have decided whether or not we're going to take military action. I don't know if we'll ever be able to have a good option where we can get 100% of those weapons out, but if the United States believes what it has said, that we will not tolerate Iranian nuclear weapons, then if they persist then we will attack.

So, I think future's very uncertain in the region.

---

Question 12: Mr. Gene Taylor (D - MS)

Summary: Mr. Perle, on the (Iraqi) oil revenues? In your opinion, when do we get to the point when the oil revenues will get to the break-even point of the cost of having our troops there.
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

Response from General Wesley Clark
transcript by Reg NYC

May I- I think this is a fundamental distinction here between the two policies.

I wouldn't have gone into Iraq with military force when we did or the way we did. I did see a need to continue to work for reform in the region, and I would've put pressure on Saddam Hussein, but I believed our primary objective was Al Qaeda.

My friend and colleague represents a group who didn't believe that.

They believed, starting at the end of the Gulf War, that with the fall of the Soviet Union this was an opportunity for the United States to use military force to clean up the Middle East. It's been expressed in any number of ways, and it included a sweeping list of countries.

I was shown a memo once in the Pentagon after 9/11, right after 9/11 that predicted that this was the way we were going to go: knock off Iraq, Syria, Lebanon. It's a great recipe, and it would be wonderful if they were all exactly like democratic states that were friendly with the United States, but how you get there is very important, and at what price.

Now the issue is, how do we succeed in Iraq?

My point is this: that if you want to succeed in Iraq, you isolate the problem. You don't make it larger. You make it smaller. You focus on it, and you work it. If you want to make the problem larger and make it a regional problem, fine. That's what we're doing, but we don't have the Armed Forces for this. Our Armed Forces are not ready and capable right now to send a three division force to clean up in Syria, at least not what I've seen.

Could we do it? Yes. Could we sustain it? No, and that still leaves us weaker when it comes time to confront Iran or North Korea. And if we believe what the President said, that the most pressing problem of our time is to keep the worst people from getting the worst weapons, then we're not doing that. We're operating off a different agenda. We're working to make the Middle East safe for Israel and for Democracy, but we're not focusing on the national security problem the President laid out in 2002. So, I think that's the difference.

I would work with Syria and Iran to transition those regimes to improve their human rights, to introduce democracy there. And if they fall, they fall, but the strategy that we're pursuing right now is sort of a regional dominoes strategy that is making it more difficult for our troops in Iraq.

Now, that's the difference between- I just want to eat the elephant a bite at a time, because that's, that's the biggest appetite we've got right now.

Richard Perle interrupts:.....

General Clark responds:Well you know, before we bombed Milosevic in Kosova, we talked to him.

I don't see any harm in talking to the Iranians face to face, in tough terms about their nuclear aspirations, about human rights, about the way they treat people. I think we should press for an opening in Iran, but I don't think that means you don't talk to them.

And the same goes with Syria. I think, you know, when you talk to people in the region, as I'm sure you do, Richard, you'll find out that one of their great concerns is that in our press to impose or liberate the region, impose democracy, institute democratic standards in the region we're going to de-stabilize at a greater rate than we can stabilize.

And all of these countries in the region are connected economically, in one way or another. They're connected culturally, in one way or another. And those responsibilities, it's what Colin Powell said, you break the china, you own it. We're about to break Syria. We're going to own it, and the same with Iran. We just better be ready for it.

I'm only counselling that if you want to succeed in Iraq, you should isolate the battlefield. That's the basic rule of military strategy.

You want to make the battlefield bigger, you better provide more forces and more resources, and get ready for a bigger fight.

Richard Perle interrupts:.....

General Clark responds:Can I just say- this-

This is the distinction between those who say use force as a last resort and those who say use force because it's more convenient, feels better, or looks better.

I'm just saying, on behalf of the men and women in uniform and this country, I understand all the evils of these regimes, but before we commit our men and women in a long-term peacekeeping mission there, we better do everything we can to put our priorities in order and get ready for it.

And we are not ready to go into Syria or Iran right now in a long-term occupation.

Richard Perle interrupts:.....

General Clark responds: But if you push the way you're pushing, that's where we're headed.

Questions 13-14: Mr. Vic Snyder (D-AR)

Question 13: Mr. Vic Snyder (D - AR):

Summary: Mr. Perle, how can you reach a conclusion about whether or not it would be advantageous or not to talk to a regime, when you have previously testified that our intelligence is "stunningly incompetent"?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

---

Question 14: Mr. Vic Snyder (D - AR):

Summary: On the issue of taking care of our troops, National Guard troops have been required to take ‘leave’ when gaps in their training schedules occur. This creates a problem for those troops, a hardship on their families and quite a long time to straighten out. This is the kind of detail thing that I believe you were talking about when you were talking about taking care of our troops.
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
transcript by Melange

Yes sir, it is and I would just say that, you know, if you really want to look at the center of gravity of the American Armed Forces - active and reserve – it’s the family and when…these seem like technical matters, there’s a dollar figure attached to this and it’s administrative but it’s a big thing for the families.

I mean, the word from the troops – active and reserve – when they come home, the biggest thing they’re worried about is their families. I’ve talked to the chaplains, I’ve talked to other people and it’s just inevitable. We saw this, we say this…see this same thing after every deployment, but especially here.

We want to hold these families together because if we’re going to keep a volunteer force together, we’ve got to keep the families on the team.

We need help and this is a small thing that we’d be asking the Department of the Army for a small number of troops but in this case it’s well-warranted.

Question 15: Mr. John Hostettler (R-IN):

Question 15: Mr. John Hostettler (R-IN):

Summary: Mr. Perle, what was your affiliation with the administration in May of 2003? In your testimony you stated that "The occupation of Iraq did much to viserate much of the goodwill that we earned, and deserved, as brave Americans risked and in all too many cases, sacrificed, their lives to liberate Iraq. We should have turned Iraq over to the Iraqis on the day Baghdad fell or soon thereafter as possible". Did you make this sentiment clear to the administration at that time? Has the situation improved?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

Questions 16-17: Ms. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA)

Question 16: Ms. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA):

Summary: What do you think we really have right now as far as the capabilities of the Iraqi army and the military infrastructure?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
Transcript by Melange

First of all with respect to the Iraqi army, I’m not there and I’m not working with them and I don’t have any access to the reports. I can’t answer... What I can tell you is there’s a process that you have to look at and you have to set the process up right.

The process is to find the lower-risk areas, redeploy US troops away from those lower-risk areas, put Iraqis in and then check to make sure the insurgency’s not taking root underneath the Iraqis.

You have to have a feedback mechanism and what, if I could suggest, what members of Congress should be doing when they’re visiting over with our troops, they should be looking at this process.

It’s not where the oil level is right now, it’s the process you’ve got to check your oil level, whether you’ve got a gauge or not because this is a process that’s going to take years – to work and train Iraqi forces to put the Iraqi defense establishment up and so forth – unless the insurgency just melts away overnight – and there’s no indication of that. It’s still there, there’s still numerous incidents everyday, they’re mounting large-scale attacks so this is an active fight, it’s going to take a process to win it.

And what we should be looking at is ‘what is that process’ and ‘is it in place’. Process entails taking risks and it entails resourcing the training and resourcing an advisory effort and those are the appropriate gauges to look at to see if we’re moving in the right direction.

Like I say to…like I said earlier with respect to the conversation with Richard Perle, a lot of what’s going on in Iraq is going to be overshadowed, or potentially overshadowed, by what’s happening in the region and so everything we can do to free up our forces now is important. So taking some risk is justified.

You asked me a second question also. Oh, on in-strengths

---

Question 17: Ms. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA):

Summary: If we need to increase our end strength, what would you suggest? What would that look like, how would we do it, what would the timeframe look like?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
Transcript by Melange

Right now the army is at the equivalent of about 650,000 people on active duty, counting the reserves. What were authorized, as I recall, something like 494 plus 30 percent…30,000 were on authorized overstrength.

Out of the active force, we think we’re going to be able to create 44 brigade level combat units under the army chief’s reorganization. To sustain 17 brigades in Iraq will take at least 51 combat brigades so we’d be 7 short. Each of those brigade groups would have maybe 3500 troops in it so you would say ‘ok, immediately that’s 30,000 troops’ but to sustain those troops, you have to have the follow-on echelons and that slice is double the forward slice, so you’d say – if you were going to size the force adequately and do it right - we’d probably need – beyond the 525,000 – probably, my figure would be about another 90,000 and that’s strictly…that’s ballpark old retired general’s back of the envelope scratching on this. That’s Army, that’s Army active – that doesn’t address what needs to be done for the reserve component.

Chairman Hunter asked early on about the overall shape of the army armed forces and the transformation effort and I do think it’s important to keep in mind that every military operation is unique.

When we set up the Paradigm for the modern armed forces in 1996 with Joint Vision 2010, we said we had to achieve full-spectrum dominance. That meant we had to be more effective than any conceivable grouping of adversaries at the high end – most intense combat - and throughout the range of combat. We knew we had problems – not at the high end but at the low intensity end because we hadn’t invested in it.

What this occupation duty in Iraq is forcing us to do is train and invest for mid-intensity and low-intensity conflict but we cannot forget the fact that we’ve got to have dominance at the top end too. So, there’s still a need for…there’s going to be a need for F-22 fighters…maybe not for 500 of them, but for F-22 fighters.

We need a…need for Navy network-centric warfare to make our forces work in the Pacific…and we need something like future combat systems for the Army to provide network-centric capabilities on the ground.

We need unmanned aerial vehicles; we need higher-performing systems in every service. So we can’t become so mesmerized by the problem of Iraq that we destroy our R&D or our procurement for the high-intensity spectrum.

This is the problem that this committee faces, obviously, in terms of resources because there aren’t enough and what I’m trying to suggest is the most urgent problem is to retain the capacity of the all-volunteer force, meaning the Army and the Marine Corps. We can’t lose that because that’s a three…that’s a thirty-year problem to try to restart that but we need to retain our grip on high-intensity combat also.

Questions 18-19: Mr. Robert Andrews (D-NJ)

Question 18: Mr. Robert Andrews (D-NJ):

Summary: You said in your testimony today that you are not optimistic about the reforms that came out of the 9/11 legislation and that far more radical reform is required. What would that "radical reform" look like?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

---

Question 19: Mr. Robert Andrews (D-NJ):

Summary: What is your degree of confidence in the present intelligence about the state of popular opinion within Iran?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

Questions 20-21 Ms. Susan Davis (D-CA):

Question 20: Ms. Susan Davis (D-CA):

Summary: You mentioned you had a year to organize and prepare the troops for Iraq. Was there another role that should have been played at that time? Why didn't that happen? Where were the voices that were encouraging more organization that weren't heard?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

---

Question 21: Ms. Susan Davis (D-CA):

Summary: Was the need for more linguistic support and Iraqi cultural understanding something that we should have been more concerned about? Are we likely to learn from these mistakes?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
transcript by Reg NYC

Well, there was always an idea that there'd be some kind of an Iraqi force that could go in. I wasn't as close to those discussions as Richard Perle was. So, I defer to his accounting of it.

It's clear that had we taken the time, we could have prepared, not only that, but we could've had someone who could've gone into each community and explained what was happening to the Iraqi people. We could've had pamphlets prepared. We could've had radio programs prepared. We could've done the kind of public information tasks that are required when a country comes in and occupies with forces.

We could've also had adequate forces to do the job, of our own, to do the post-conflict job, and even you know, created like an interim government. Instead, we did it all the hard way.

And not having the Iraqi forces was just part, a small part of the problem.

Rep. Susan Davis: Do you think that we have learned from those mistakes?

Well, if I could be so bold as to suggest this.

I think this committee should be holding hearings right now on what the United States plans to do when Syria collapses, because that's clearly the aim of our policy. You've heard Richard today express that that's what should happen.

We should be holding those hearings. I mean, they don't necessarily involve, they shouldn't involve me.

They should be classified hearings, but you should be encouraging the Executive Branch to do the, to put the foresight into this and the planning into it. So that if that government collapses that there's something there other than anarchy.

Now, the United States government, I don't know if it would participate and say this was the policy or not, but what I see is, I see us going into this again, both with Syria, with Lebanon, Syria and Iran, pushing for a result without doing the hard work beforehand to make sure when we get the initial result we want, that we can follow through.

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

Question 22: Mr. Jim Cooper (D-TN):

Question 22: Mr. Jim Cooper (D-TN):

Summary: Are you suggesting the American taxpayer pay higher prices for oil? Are you suggesting a tax increase? What was our plan going into Iraq? How are we going to pay for this war?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

Questions 23-24: Mr. Jim Saxton (R-NJ)

Question 23: Mr. Jim Saxton (R-NJ):

Summary: Can you comment on this paragraph in your book regarding the mindset of the men and women in the Islamic world?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

---

Question 24: Mr. Jim Saxton (R-NJ):

Summary: What do you see transpiring in the Middle Eastern societies who are developing the kind of governments we are aiming to promote, and the influence of groups like Hezbollah and Hammas?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
transcript by Reg NYC

Just to follow up on that.

There are organizations, many of them taking active work inside countries in the Middle East right now. The National Endowment for Democracy is one that's very active there. There are a number of other institutions. They deserve the support of the American people.

And we need to encourage our allies and friends around the world to join in these efforts. It's one of the reasons why I believe we should be talking with governments, because when we talk with governments it lets us facilitate the support of human rights workers and Democracy organizations around the world.

But there's another issue that Richard has brought up that he didn't fully come back to that I'd like to stress in front of the committee. When we're fighting terrorism, we are fighting a battle for the minds of the men and women. But it's not a battle that's necessarily going to be won by improving their, either their participation in government or their material conditions.

Rather than simply jailing terrorists and holding them there without release or shooting them, what at least one government in the Middle East has begun to do is send in Islamic clerics to talk with them.

Many of the people who are terrorists against us, who are so committed to what they believe that they're willing to sacrifice their lives for it, are people who have strong religious beliefs that can be argued. And so, there are examples of terrorists actually being argued with for days and days and days, and renouncing their previous convictions that the Q'oran suggested they should use force.

So, I just want to underscore to the committee that when we're talking about the threats we face, this threat of terrorism is an ideological challenge to the United States and what we believe in about the rights of man and human dignity, no different in the challenge than the threat of Communism was. And just as we fought against Communism on an ideological basis as well as on a material basis, we need to encourage our friends in the Islamic world to use the appropriate ideological combat to change the minds of men and women.

It can work, and it might even- if we did it in Guantanamo- it might even provide a solution to the vexing problem of what we're going to do with these people we're holding in Guantanamo.

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

Questions 25-26: Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-CA):

Question 25: Chairman Duncan Hunter: (R-CA):

Summary: Are you overstating the potential danger of pushing back the dictatorships (in the Middle East)? Are you overstating the dangers of freedom?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
transcript by Reg NYC

No, I don't. I'm not in any way overstating the dangers of freedom. But first of all, you know how much a high regard I have for you and what you've done for the Armed Forces. We've got a long relationship, going back a long way.

I did review the testimony from 2002 prior to coming here, and you were, you had a theme then about how long we could wait before we went into Iraq, and why I kept saying time was on our side, and you kept challenging me about the efficacy of inspections. And I never could quite satisfy you with my answer, but - and I'll let the records speak for themselves on the urgency of going into Iraq. Now, with respect-

Chairman Duncan Hunter interrupts: ...

Well, without replaying that debate, I think in terms of 2003 and the urgency of going to war, even though I couldn't answer the logic of your question, I think what we're trying to do here is discuss judgment. So, let me just talk about the issue you raised now.

First of all remember that in Europe, it wasn't just Ronald Reagan and his labeling the Soviet Union and The Evil Empire that brought it down. Although I'm very proud of what President Reagan did, and I'm proud of Richard Perle's policies at the time, which helped us succeed.

It started with the Helsinki accord. It started with discussions and dialog. The Pope was a huge factor in bringing down Eastern Europe. So were the labor unions and the AFL-CIO, which had strong liaison and were used as a channel. So was Citibank and all of the Western industrial and economic institutions, which gradually undercut the legitimacy.

President Reagan never invaded Eastern Europe. In fact-

Chairman Duncan Hunter interrupts: ...

Actually, if I can be-

Chairman Duncan Hunter interrupts: ...

But let me- let's be technically accurate.

The relationship with the Pope began under President Carter, not under President Reagan. It was Brzezinski who went to Afghanistan and said, "We can do something here." And it was General Hague who called for an answer to the SS20 during the Carter Administration. So, I want to give full credit- but I don't- to the United States, but I don't want this to be a partisan issue.

What I want to do is try to put in in context. It was- Reagan was a very sophisticated player. He talked to Gorbachev. Reagan, when the Marines were struck in Beirut, and we lost 283 Marines, Reagan did not invade Lebanon to seek vengeance on, for those Marines' deaths. He pulled back out. So, he was a subtle and sophisticated player.

Now, when you translate that to where we are today, I think the example of elections is an important example all the way around the world. The example of Eastern Europe has had a powerful impact on the Middle East. The example of Ukraine has had an impact on the Middle East.

But you're not suggesting, are you, that the invasion of Iraq pressured Hosni Mubarak.

Chairman Duncan Hunter comments: ....

That's fine.

Chairman Duncan Hunter comments: ...

I think that- I don't disagree with what you're saying, that it has political meaning. All of US policy has been pushing for elections for a long time. I think we should've been pushing harder on Hosni Mubarak.

But you know, I want to be very, very careful on two points here I think are critical.

Point number one: The President has said that we want Democracy in the, in the Middle East for our own national security purposes. I think we have to be very careful with that notion. We want Democracy for them, because we want people everywhere to have the benefits of the same rights and liberties and dignity that we enjoy. That's what their citizens come and immigrate to America to have. There's no reason why they shouldn't have it at home, but to trumpet that we want this for our purposes excites a resistance, which in fact is counterproductive.

And secondly, we have been pushing for destabilization of regimes that has nothing to do with Democracy. The majority of the terrorists, of course, came from Saudi Arabia. Why then are- did we invade Iraq and are we pushing on Syria, the way you've heard Richard Perle describe, for other reasons? Now, I'm happy to push Syria out and push Assad out. I'd love to see a democracy there.

But here's the point: if it- if Assad leaves and we destabilize this, we have to be prepared to help pick up the pieces. How would we do that? With a United Nations mission? Calling on the Saudis, maybe get the Egyptians there? We don't know that, but it's irresponsible for the United States, as the dominant player in the world right now, to be threatening governments and pushing them down, and then not being prepared and working to help create the conditions which can meet their citizens' needs.

People in the region say, "Look, give us a chance." They say they want, they all want Democracy, but they don't want to go through, they do not want the condition of lawlessness that we've allowed to happen in Iraq.

---

Question 26: Chairman Duncan Hunter: (R-CA):

Summary: Continuing discussion of previous question

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
transcript by Reg NYC

Mr. Chairman- Mr. Chairman, I think we're talking past each other. I'm trying to talk about national strategy and big picture. And I feel like what you're trying to do is take political credit. Now let's talk about-

Chairman Duncan Hunter interrupts: ....

Then let's talk about the Iraqi model.

Chairman Duncan Hunter comments: ....

Well, we moved in Eastern Europe. We, we didn't- We moved in Poland, in the Czech Republic, in Slovakia, in Hungary.

Chairman Duncan Hunter interrupts: ....

And we did that without a war.

Chairman Duncan Hunter interrupts: ....

Okay, but what's happening in Iraq.

Chairman Duncan Hunter comments: ....

Well, that's what I've been trying to talk about, Mr. Chairman. What I'm suggesting is that in the first place that there, there's a fundamental difference between- Let me just say this. Yes-

Chairman Duncan Hunter interrupts: ....

Look, first let me say - and my Democratic colleagues know this - Mr. Chairman, I voted for Ronald Reagan. That's a matter of public record. I've said it. I supported it. It's not just in hindsight. I believed in it. I believed in what he said and what he stood for for the advance of freedom.

The difference is: We did not invade Eastern Europe. We did not excite patriotic East Europeans to fight American soldiers. We did not kick down people's doors, throw their women on the ground, rifle through their belongings and, and shoot them up. We've had to do that in Iraq. So please, be very careful when you say 'The Iraqi Model.' 'The Iraqi Model.' To you it may only mean, when you say it, that there are elections. But to the rest of the world what it means is: The United States invaded a country under false pretenses that turned out to be false, bad intelligence, weren't weapons of mass destruction, had ulterior motives that Mr. Perle has suggested, didn't go in there just for WMD, went in for a lot of different reasons, and then occupied the country and finally got elections, and in the meantime, put the Iraqi people through chaos.

So, what I'm suggesting is: I'm all in favor of the liberation of the Middle East and democratization. I don't think Hosni Mubarak is putting elections in Egypt because we invaded Iraq, though. I think he recognizes - just as the Saudis do and everybody in the region - that governments, if they're going to survive, must have legitimacy.

These governments, these ruling families, they're trying to survive. And they know that they've got to be legitimate. Part of it is they're seeing it in television, but it's not just in Iraq. But part of it is the threat of Al Qaeda, who's coming in and undercutting their legitimacy.

So, I'm sure you wouldn't want to give Al Qaeda any credit for the Democracy movement in the region, but when I travel through the region and I listen to rulers speak, what they're telling me is, what they're telling other people is, "You either reform, or you will be thrown out."

So, there are a lot of influences at work here.

My concern is for the United States government and for our Armed Forces, if we are pursuing actively, overtly or covertly, a policy to destabilize and topple old regimes, like Syria, then we just better be prepared to pick up the pieces or help somebody else do so, because we don't want the reputation of going in and knocking down governments and abandoning people.

And there's still chaos in the streets of Iraq. You're not hearing it in the newspapers, but I talked to people who've been there. They tell me horrible stories of kidnappings and abductions and murders and beheadings and common criminals in the streets. We don't want that to happen.

And you know, when it first started in Iraq, I remember Secretary Rumsfeld said, "Well you know, freedom's a messy thing, and you know, these things are going to happen." He couldn't have been more wrong.

The first thing we learned when we went into Haiti in 1994 was the United States Armed Forces are on the ground. They're responsible. If we destabilize these governments, we are responsible. And that's all I'm trying to say.

I'm all in favor of Democracy and freedom. I supported Ronald Reagan, and I want to see every person in the Middle East have a vote and have the same rights we do. I just want to do it in a smart, intelligent fashion that supports our national security, not detracts from it.


Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

Questions 27-28: Mr. Mark Udall (D-CO)

Question 27: Mr. Mark Udall (D-CO):

Summary: Would you comment on the actual number of casualties, including those wounded and suffering from PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder), in the Iraq war?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark:
Transcript by Melange

Well, first of all, I tell you with respect to US casualties, that nobody has the exact number of people who will end up injured, wounded and psychologically damaged after the combat.

My guess is it will be significant because…I think when you kill people at close range, under stress, for a prolonged period – as many of our soldiers have – even if you’re totally unscratched, that psychologically that comes back to haunt you. You may feel totally justified by it at the time. It may be a fear reaction, but there are likely to be several thousand, tens of thousands, who experience long-term after effects in terms of anger, depression or other symptoms.

You can’t calculate the impact on families from the separation and the stress that this entails. And, this is why the Army is undergoing such care in bringing people back and post processing but if you talk to the people in the units, they’ll tell you that divorces are rampant, family problems are everywhere these are just…these are enormous scars that people carry for the rest of their lives, physical or emotional or mental from these conflicts.

And in addition, I just want to say one other thing that strikes me is that we’re talking about American casualties. One of the things we didn’t do, and I understand why General Franks didn’t want to do this – he said he’s not doing a body count so he didn’t keep track of the enemy losses, but we just don’t know what the figure is on total Iraqi losses. I don’t have any idea.

I’ve heard the figure of 100,000, I’ve heard the figure refuted, said it’s way too high but I think that the important point is that when you talk about costs, you have to not only talk about the cost to Americans but you have to talk about the cost to the Iraqis.

People in Iraq are citizens of the region. They’re not only that, they’re related to people in the region so when I’m in Kuwait or Bahrain, I find people who have cousins in Iraq and their family…some of them speak English, some of them have been educated in this country – they’re part of the casualty total of this operation.

And I just think it makes sense when we talk about the costs, and we’re…especially, as the chairman was talking about with democracy and how we can help impel it forward in the Middle East – we recognize it’s not just American lives that are at risk here, it’s a lot of lives from a lot of different groups.

---

Question 28: Mr. Mark Udall (D-CO):

Summary: Would you comment on the idea that we are using an outdated model or old mindset by confusing the situation with Soviet States and Communism with the invasion of Iraq and Islamic fundamentalism? That we are using a nation-state symmetrical model when we look at deploying our military force and using it?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
Transcript by Melange

I think you’re exactly right, I think that, um, and I can’t speak for why it was done inside the administration – I’ve read it, I guess Richard Perle should speak for it more directly, um, it was told to me by the generals who were involved in the discussions that this administration more or less decided to go after Iraq because they didn’t know what to do, didn’t feel confident they could really deal with the problem of terrorism directly so they went after it in a proxy form by going after states.

If they couldn’t get the terrorists, at least get the states that support it and then it looked like the best state to go after was Iraq and there were a host of other reasons why you could do that.

But, the truth is that we do have to fight terrorism, not only through democratization and the improvement of living standards around the world, but we also have to fight the ideology and, we need to be able to confront the ideology of Islam. We can’t do it – I can’t do it, I’m not Islamic – but people who are Islamic scholars can debate on the interpretations of various sections of the Koran and they’ve had some success in doing so and even changing the minds of some of these people who are terrorists. I think ultimately that’s the way you win.

We should be trying to take terrorists and turn them around. During the Cold War, there was a guy named Eric Hoffer who was…many of us read it in school, and he was a Communist. He was, as I recall, a dock worker in the 1930’s and he became the greatest apostle for freedom because he’d been there and he knew how to address it. We should find people who are Islamics, who have been terrorists, who have changed their minds. We should be letting those people speak, giving them platforms, encouraging them because we can win ideologically and that’s the best way to win this war.

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

Questions 29-31: Mr. Ike Skelton (D-MO)

Question 29: Mr. Ike Skelton (D-MO):

Summary: You told us that you did not agree with General Kean that we were seduced by Iraqi exiles, but in your testimony you said: "There is reason to believe that we were sucked into an ill-conceived initial attack aimed at Saddam himself by double-agents planted by the regime".

What is the difference between General Kean's comment and this comment?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

---

Question 30: Mr. Ike Skelton (D-MO):

Summary: If each of you had full power to have made decisions immediately after initial conflict in Iraq ended, what you have done differently for a better outcome?
(question summary by incap)


Play Audio

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)

Response from General Wesley Clark
Transcript by Melange

Well, Congressman, your question is assuming you couldn’t have changed anything before the fall of Baghdad.

Obviously I would have slowed the pace of action until we had our planning and preparation caught up, run through and exhausted the diplomatic efforts and demanded a number of things from Saddam Hussein and his regime as we went through that. So, my idea would have been to infiltrate intelligence operatives and human rights monitors and democracy workers and a whole lot of people into Iraq during this process of inspections were under way. And, to have tried to disassemble the Iraqi government in pieces during that period - could have been a prolonged period unless we hit a trigger point at which we had to strike and during that period we would have done some of the things that Richard’s suggesting – building up a government in exile, training Iraqi forces in case we did have to fight and so forth.

Set aside all that, it’s the 9th of April or so of 2003…the first thing we needed was a unified authority on the ground in Iraq representing the United States of America and the coalition. We didn’t have that. We had a US military commander who was commanding two deputies - a military deputy and then Jay Garner who was reporting through the military commander to the Secretary of Defense and that doesn’t work.

We should have had a top-level leader. You need a Richard Holbrooke kind of a guy. Put him on the ground in Iraq, tell the military commander ‘support him, he’s setting up the directions for the government, do what you have to do to maintain security – you get in there and work with the Iraqis and put that together’. We didn’t have that in place until we put John Negroponte on the ground last summer of 2004. So, we wasted an awful long time without an effective, unified authority on the ground in Iraq.

Secondly, we didn’t have enough troops. We should have immediately brought forward more troops, more rapidly. We should have called on the United Nations and Arab governments to join us in that. We probably needed, during the initial period, 250-300,000 troops - just for presence purposes to be there on the ground, to walk through the area, to say ‘we’re here, we’re not going to hurt you, you know, go about your business.’

In places like Falluja, they didn’t see us for six weeks until someone drove through. So, this was a mistake. We needed more forces there.

Third we should have pushed interpreters forward – even when we had forces there, we didn’t have the ability to communicate with the Iraqi people. I don’t know why we didn’t go out to the Arab American community and bring in tens of thousands of native Arabic speakers – people from Iraq and Yemen and everywhere in the region who can communicate with people on the ground in Iraq. And say ‘come in, you know, here’s a six-week program of getting you trained, we’re going to give you extra pay, come over here and do your duty for both your old country and your new country and help us.’ We didn’t do that.

I think we should have ordered the Iraqi military and the Iraqi ministries to stay on duty. We should have had the Iraqi military back in their barracks. We should have had inspections. We should have lined them up; we should have looked them in the eye. We should have then started a debriefing program to find out who was what, what they did and so forth and move through this in a logical way to take them apart.

I hope these are the kinds of lessons…and then, one more thing if I can say that, after we got into this, we should have had a transition program that would have turned over US political authority as rapidly as possible to the Iraqis themselves and, absent that, to a United Nations mandate that would have put someone in, other than the Americans, leading the elections.

Now, obviously you’re leading the witnesses here, sir, because you want us to tell you these things. I hope that they will be applied to the next government that falls in the next region in the Middle East. I hope we’ll have the planning ready, the forces ready, the diplomacy ready, the translators ready – all that can be done.

It’s as easy to do that as it is…it’s as easy to get it started as it is to start with the Syrian Accountability Act. We should be preparing the way if we have to use it, not be caught flat-footed.

---

Question 31: Mr. Ike Skelton (D-MO):

Summary: What would be the one thing you would recommend to this administration to increase the chances of achieving success in Iraq?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
Transcript by Melange

I’ll hear Richard’s answer because I’ve got several different things…but basically…well, let me say this before I surrender my time so quickly.

Rep. Skelton comments: That can be a very dangerous thing around here.

Exactly. I think the action is actually…I think things are moving in the right direction from everything I can see. I think it’s a matter of…I think the principal problem for us is sustaining our ability to remain engaged. I think we are trying to work with the Iraqi people. I think we are trying to train the Iraqi security forces. I think the military is trying to get the advisory position in place.

I think that we’ve got…if there’s only one thing else that we could do is to take away the regional resistence. We need a little diplomatic action in the region to bring in some other Arab states to reinforce us. I was over there, of course, leaders told me they’d be happy to send troops but we haven’t asked. I don’t know if that’s true or not but that’s what I heard. And, um, and I do go back to the idea of a regional council in which not only Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Turkey and Jordan are present, but also Iran and Syria. And in which we hold those nations accountable to some extent to help us in Iraq rather than keeping them on the outside of the circle and making them the next targets.

So, that…those are the approaches I would take in Iraq and then we’ve got to sustain our military, add to the force so we can do our job there.

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio

Question 32 and Conclusion: Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-CA)

Question 32: Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-CA):

Summary: Do you go for a very quick hand-off to the Iraqi military or a slower, more extended hand-off?
(question summary by incap)

Play Audio

Response from General Wesley Clark
transcript by Reg NYC

Oh, I'd go for a longer hand-off, but we'll have to support that. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Duncan Hunter comments: ...

Longer, the more extended hand-off in terms of advisors and other things, but you'll have to support it. And it means increasing the instrength, the active instrength of the United States Army, and that's billions of dollars additional resources we're talking about to do that.

Chairman Duncan Hunter comments: ...

I think it depends on how you define "the tougher security jobs." There's two things that are tough about the- there's three thing that are tough.

There's first of all, the intelligence collection. They cannot do, and we're not going to give them the techniques to do right now, all of the sophisticated technical stuff we've got. So, they're not going to have that.

Chairman Duncan Hunter interrupts: ...

Number two is, there's the sort of kicking down doors in the middle of the night and pulling people out of their homes. Now, it's my understanding they've hired back a lot of people from the old regime, who were part of the Ministry of Interior and are really good at doing this. And that's a very dangerous thing to have done, but that's what's being done, I'm told. And that means that we're building in an automatic conflict in between the government and it's own servants, in terms of standards of dignity and law, rule of law and so forth. That's a tough task. We've already started turning it over to the Iraqis, and I'm in favor of really close supervision of that one as long as you can get away with that without infringing too much on Iraqi sovereignty.

And then there's the tough task of using big battalions, combat support, air-ground coordination and so forth. You got to walk up to this one. It takes us in the United States Army sixteen years to train a battalion commander and longer for a brigade commander.

So, assuming we've got some captains that have come in, two or three years of training, that's not asking too much. At this point, having invested all these lives and all these hundreds of billions of dollars and all of our national prestige in this, then I think we need to do as much as we can to minimize the risk that something's going to go seriously wrong during this phase of the operation.

And that means that I would err on the side of planning for, resourcing and preparing for a longer stay. Then if you can reduce it, fine, but not to try to cut corners now.

Chairman Duncan Hunter comments: ...

Richard Perle comments: ...

Duncan Hunter comments: ...

Thank you Mr, Chairman.

Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)