Questions 11-12: Mr. Gene Taylor (D-MS)
Question 11: Mr. Gene Taylor (D-MS):
Summary: Mr. Perle, prior to the war vote a lot of the neo-conservatives made a point of saying that this conflict would be paid for by the Iraqi oil revenues. My question to you is how could we have been so far off on that and when do you anticipate we get to a point when those revenues start helping to pay for this huge cost to the American taxpayer?
General Clark, I distinctly remember you coming before the committee and saying, "look we're gonna win but one thing you need to keep in mind is we will be there at least 10 years...."
I remember mentioning this to the president when he was asking for our votes and he kind of dismissed it. It looks like you were pretty close to the mark. Because you were pretty close to the mark on that, where do you think it goes from here?
(question summary by incap)
Play Audio
Response from General Wesley Clark
transcript by Reg NYC
Well, here's where I think we are right now.
I think the military actions are- have been effective. General Casey did the right thing, in my view in shutting down Najaf and Fallujah and all that action that occurred in the fall.
We did a good job of protecting the elections.
I think there's effective training going on, maybe not at the pace we want it to go on, with the Iraqis. And we are going to create an advisory effort. I see no reason why that shouldn't work mechanically, sociologically in the region and in Iraq. It should work. There's no superpower against us. There's no sanctuary out there that's totally, that's difficult for us to work against, as say what we had in Vietnam. So, this is a military operation on the ground which should be winnable.
The real questions in this issue are twofold.
First, what happens in the region and secondly, then what is the impact on Al Qaeda?
What happens in the region is unclear. The Syrians are pulling out of Lebanon. If you're working this and you figure that both Iran and Syria know they're next on the chopping block, then they don't want to see us succeed, and the more pressure we put on and the more we convince them that they have no future, those regimes have no future, the greater the efforts they'll make to stall us in Iraq. So, it's unpredictable in the sense that the more we press against Syria, the more likely it is that Iran is going to use its leverage inside Iraq to complicate our work inside Iraq.
So, we're at the point where we've got our Armed Forces on the ground and pressure can be put against our Armed Forces. For us to have greater strategic maneuver room in the region, we need to be pulling our Armed Forces out, so we've got greater leverage on the situation.
We need to be working to reassure the Syrian regime at the same time we're working to transform and create a greater opening inside Syria. And I believe we need to be working and dialoging with the Iranians, even as we want Iran to have greater respect for Democracy and human rights in its own country.
I see a three to five year period of continued US troop presence in Iraq, a possible mission to stabilize Syria that could come as a result of a catastrophic collapse of the Syrian government and unpredictable consequences with respect to Iran.
I assume that at some point the Iranians will have decided whether or not they're going to press ahead with nuclear weapons, and we'll have decided whether or not we're going to take military action. I don't know if we'll ever be able to have a good option where we can get 100% of those weapons out, but if the United States believes what it has said, that we will not tolerate Iranian nuclear weapons, then if they persist then we will attack.
So, I think future's very uncertain in the region.
Question 12: Mr. Gene Taylor (D - MS)
Summary: Mr. Perle, on the (Iraqi) oil revenues? In your opinion, when do we get to the point when the oil revenues will get to the break-even point of the cost of having our troops there.
(question summary by incap)
Play Audio
Response from Richard Perle (not transcribed but available on audio)
Response from General Wesley Clark
transcript by Reg NYC
May I- I think this is a fundamental distinction here between the two policies.
I wouldn't have gone into Iraq with military force when we did or the way we did. I did see a need to continue to work for reform in the region, and I would've put pressure on Saddam Hussein, but I believed our primary objective was Al Qaeda.
My friend and colleague represents a group who didn't believe that.
They believed, starting at the end of the Gulf War, that with the fall of the Soviet Union this was an opportunity for the United States to use military force to clean up the Middle East. It's been expressed in any number of ways, and it included a sweeping list of countries.
I was shown a memo once in the Pentagon after 9/11, right after 9/11 that predicted that this was the way we were going to go: knock off Iraq, Syria, Lebanon. It's a great recipe, and it would be wonderful if they were all exactly like democratic states that were friendly with the United States, but how you get there is very important, and at what price.
Now the issue is, how do we succeed in Iraq?
My point is this: that if you want to succeed in Iraq, you isolate the problem. You don't make it larger. You make it smaller. You focus on it, and you work it. If you want to make the problem larger and make it a regional problem, fine. That's what we're doing, but we don't have the Armed Forces for this. Our Armed Forces are not ready and capable right now to send a three division force to clean up in Syria, at least not what I've seen.
Could we do it? Yes. Could we sustain it? No, and that still leaves us weaker when it comes time to confront Iran or North Korea. And if we believe what the President said, that the most pressing problem of our time is to keep the worst people from getting the worst weapons, then we're not doing that. We're operating off a different agenda. We're working to make the Middle East safe for Israel and for Democracy, but we're not focusing on the national security problem the President laid out in 2002. So, I think that's the difference.
I would work with Syria and Iran to transition those regimes to improve their human rights, to introduce democracy there. And if they fall, they fall, but the strategy that we're pursuing right now is sort of a regional dominoes strategy that is making it more difficult for our troops in Iraq.
Now, that's the difference between- I just want to eat the elephant a bite at a time, because that's, that's the biggest appetite we've got right now.
Richard Perle interrupts:.....
General Clark responds:Well you know, before we bombed Milosevic in Kosova, we talked to him.
I don't see any harm in talking to the Iranians face to face, in tough terms about their nuclear aspirations, about human rights, about the way they treat people. I think we should press for an opening in Iran, but I don't think that means you don't talk to them.
And the same goes with Syria. I think, you know, when you talk to people in the region, as I'm sure you do, Richard, you'll find out that one of their great concerns is that in our press to impose or liberate the region, impose democracy, institute democratic standards in the region we're going to de-stabilize at a greater rate than we can stabilize.
And all of these countries in the region are connected economically, in one way or another. They're connected culturally, in one way or another. And those responsibilities, it's what Colin Powell said, you break the china, you own it. We're about to break Syria. We're going to own it, and the same with Iran. We just better be ready for it.
I'm only counselling that if you want to succeed in Iraq, you should isolate the battlefield. That's the basic rule of military strategy.
You want to make the battlefield bigger, you better provide more forces and more resources, and get ready for a bigger fight.
Richard Perle interrupts:.....
General Clark responds:Can I just say- this-
This is the distinction between those who say use force as a last resort and those who say use force because it's more convenient, feels better, or looks better.
I'm just saying, on behalf of the men and women in uniform and this country, I understand all the evils of these regimes, but before we commit our men and women in a long-term peacekeeping mission there, we better do everything we can to put our priorities in order and get ready for it.
And we are not ready to go into Syria or Iran right now in a long-term occupation.
Richard Perle interrupts:.....
General Clark responds: But if you push the way you're pushing, that's where we're headed.