From the Diaries -- Brent

To learn more about Eric Massa and the Massa for Congress campaign, please visit Eric's website, www.massaforcongress.com

Over the course of the past five years perhaps the most influential member of the Bush White House has been the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. From day one he maneuvered to control the decision making process inside the White House, eventually driving out more moderate Secretaries like General Colin Powell and former Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O’Neil –not to mention former Secretary of he EPA, Christie Todd Whitman. His public persona reached it’s apex during his brief tenure as a day time TV star when he gave his daily briefings on the conduct of the invasion of Iraq. And for those brief few days it seemed as if his vision of lightly armored, rapidly deployed, American military dominance on the battlefield, and throughout the world, would permeate not only the Pentagon but also the entire Administration.

Yet, the facts of his tenure do not support the reality that he was attempting to project. As a Secretary of Defense who arrived with an agenda of transforming the Pentagon into a new instrument of lighter more mobile forces he became a tool for the neo conservative movement who saw the opportunity to play out their vision of a new American century as they had documented in their rings for some 20 years prior to the Bush Administration. Both the Secretary and the neo-cons were fatally wrong.

Rumsfeld’s report card is a record of poor performance and red letter “F’s”

Failure of pre-war intelligence for WMD’s in Iraq.

Failure to properly plan for the Iraq deployment.

Failure to plan for post-combat operations in Iraq.

Failure to predict and anticipate the cost of the Operations in Afghanistan.

Failure and inability to provide adequate and timely force and self protection equipment.

Failure to respond to the threat of improvised explosive devices (IED).

Failure to clarify the policies that led to torture of Iraqi prisoners and detainees.

Failure to stop the pursuit of the BRAC - Base Realignment and Closure - in time of war.

History will record one of the main disasters of the Rumsfeld Pentagon to be the total failure of pre-war intelligence of WMDs in Iraq. In response to ABC news host George Stephanopoulos question about the status of U.S. and coalition forces search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld stated, “We know where they are. They’re in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat.” (This Week With George Stephanopoulos, March 30, 2003.)

In fact, they were not. This failure is at the very center of the strategic mistake that took American forces into Iraq and Secretary Rumsfeld has yet to ever admit that he was wrong.

Even less forgivable was his personal failure to properly plan for the Iraq deployment. Rumsfeld and his team of civilian planners went against normal deployment operations when they rejected the TPFDL (Time Phased Forces Deployment List). This is the Pentagons most sophisticated war document and it ties all elements of military deployment together – telling logistics experts what to move when, so that when the fighting forces arrive in theater all the elements of support (such a critical body armor) are in place, in the right place, and in the correct order. Rumsfeld rejected the use of the TPFDL - calling it unwieldy and unnecessary. He stated that the elements of supply contained in the document were to big and to heavy to move quickly and he embarked on a public relations blitz to convince both the White House (where there were no former military personnel on staff who would know better), Congress (where there is decreasing number of Veterans who would know better) and the American people (who are to busy trying to earn a living to know better) that more could be done with less.

He also informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Senior Commanding body of the US military, that he would control the timing and flow of Marine and Army troops in to the combat zone. This was unprecedented. It took every lesson that has been learned since Vietnam and threw it out the window. In real terms, this meant that the Generals had no input on which units went where and when - these decisions Rumsfeld made himself. A full account of this decision process can be found in The New Yorker, FACT – Annals of National Security Offense and Defense by Seymour M. Hersh.

Compounding his failure to properly plan for the invasion, the American people rapidly realized that the plan for post-combat operations in Iraq was woefully inadequate. As looting and riots broke out all over Baghdad, Rumsfeld proclaimed that democracy was a “messy business.” Despite reports and objections by many senior military officials, the U.S. began its’ running start in Iraq with too few forces to stabilize the country after the cessation of combat. This was well known and when the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Shinseki, reported to Congress that it would take many times more troops than reported by the Secretary, the General was fired. In a February 27th, 2003 joint press conference with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Secretary Rumsfeld was asked if Army Chief of Staff Shinseki’s estimate that it would take several hundred thousand troops on the ground to secure Iraq was wrong. The Secretary responded,

“The fact of the matter is that the answer to the question that was posed to him (Shinseki) is not knowable. We have no idea how long the war will last. We don’t know to what extent there may be weapons of mass destructions used. We don’t know – have any idea whether or not there would be ethnic strife. We don’t know exactly how long it would take to find weapons of mass destruction and destroy then – those sites. There are so many variables that it is not knowable. However, I will say this; what is, I think, reasonably certain is the idea that it would take several hundred thousand U. S. forces I think is far from the mark. The reality is that we already have a number of countries that have offered to participate with their forces in stabilization activities, in the event forces have to be used. Second, it’s not logical to me that it would take as many forces to win the war – following the conflict as it would to win the war.”

Many military professionals, I among them, knew what the Secretary was saying to be false and I, like many, made my views known within our respective positions. In my case it was the beginning of the end of my appointment as a member of the Republican appointed Staff of the House Armed Services Committee.

With a long and by somewhat respected business background, it is all the more inconceivable that Secretary Rumsfeld was totally unable to predict and anticipate the cost of the Operations in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration requested an emergency supplemental appropriation of $80 Billion – largely for the then continuing operations in Iraq and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan. According to a CBO report, the $80 billion request came on top of a $25 billion requirement for the cost of operations for the previous year. The costs of the operations were 88 billion in 2004 and 78.6 billion in 2003. With the new supplemental request the CBO estimates that the cumulative total for these operations since September 11, 2001 is 277 billion. By comparison, according to the Commerce Department, the inflation adjusted costs for WW I and the Korean War were $200 billion and 350 billion respectively. (Jonathan Weisman, Washington Post, Wednesday, Jan 26, 2005. Record ’05 Deficit Forecast page A01). The price associated with the war in Iraq was sold at a much lower rate than what it has cost us.

Perhaps most unforgivable among this list of total failures was the inability to provide adequate and timely force and self protection equipment to the deploying U. S. forces. Because of a total reliance on rapid light deployment with no logistics back up, thousands of personnel entered the combat theater without the basic body armor that has proved to save so many lives. Members of Congress in both parties had repeatedly raised the issue of armor protection for vehicles used by the U.S. and coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom for over a year prior to that Q&A session. Although much attention has been devoted to this issue since the Tennessee National Guardsman raised the issue with Secretary at a December 9 2004 Questions and Answer session with the U.S. forces in Kuwait, Secretary Rumsfeld’s response was well short of what was required to adequately prove up-armor kits for HUMVEEs and trucks used by U. S. Forces in Iraq.

The civilian leaders in the Pentagon who took total control of the military deployment and the initial operational phases of the invasion of Iraq totally failed to respond to the threat of improvised explosive devices (IED) that have become the mainstay of the combat in the urban areas. The use of IEDs dates back to the very beginning of modern military combat when they were extensively utilized in the jungles and urban areas of Vietnam. Entire teams were assembled and deployed to counter this threat in Desert Storm, but because of Rumfeld’s total rejection of lessons learned from previous military operations, this reality was not admitted to until it was too late. Additionally, as there were no troops to adequately secure the thousands of military ammunition storage areas in Iraq, the basic elements of the IED manufacture were available for the taking for quite some time following the conclusion of initial combat operations.

Secretary Rusted is personally and directly responsible for the lack of clarity in the policies that led to the torture of Iraqi prisoners and Global War on Terrorism detainees. This scandal – which continues to grow beyond the limited bounds of Abu Gharib, reflected a total break down of the entire chain of command and not just the misbehavior of a small group of enlisted soldiers at the prison. While many have dismissed the abuse on the grounds of the barbarianism of many of those very prisoners, they fail to see the larger picture of the scandals impact on the larger Arab world and the exceptional tool for recruiting additional suicide bombers in this region. Chairman of the advisory panel established to confront this issue, James Schlesinger, appointed by Secretary Rumsfeld said that that although there was not an official policy of abuse involved in Abu Gharib prison scandal, it was still a fundamental failure of leadership ranging from the ground troops all the way up to the Executive office - including the Pentagon, that allowed the situation to occur. Additionally, Tillie K. Fowler, former Republican Member of Congress, asserted that these failures contributed to the abuses in the prison. “We believe that there is institutional and personal responsibility right up to the chain of command as far as Washington is concerned,” Schlesinger told a news conference upon the release of the 126 page report.

Compounding these failures in the theaters of combat was Rumsfeld’s pursuit of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process in time of war and great uncertainty. Secretary Rumsfeld vigorously fought for, and secured authority to close 25% of the military infrastructure in the continental United States in 2005. The original DOD estimate that it possessed an excess of 25% capacity in its’ military bases was first determined by Secretary Cohen in 1998 – years before the attacks of September 11 and the ongoing operations in the Middle and Near East. Common sense tells the American public that our military obligations and pace of operations has radically increased since this initial estimate in 1998.

In the 29th Congressional District, our ONLY military base, a reserve mobilization center from which local National Guard and Reserve forces deploy to Iraq will close and be moved three ours away WHILE THOSE FORCES ARE STILL DEPLOYED. These men and women will come home to a base that has shut its door to them. The impact of this closure will force those returning men and women to “commute” three hours to and from a new consolidation facility in Syracuse. There will be a radical decrease in the availability of services and support for those troops and their families. John Randy “Rubber Stamp” Kuhl, the Tom Delay look alike in the 29th Congressional District stated that he did not know enough about the facility to state whether or not it should stay open. After representing this area for over 20 years it seems as if he should know better.

Secretary Rumsfeld and his Rubber Stamping allies in Congress once again showed that while they think that troops are “fungible” - they are not focused or concerned about the results of their decision for the lives of the men and women who must mobilize to carry out their orders.

The 2006 DOD Budget request, still yet to be passed by the Senate and the joint Senate House conference despite the fact that we are now several months into the new fiscal year, contains massive cuts to major weapons procurement systems. Among these programs that are being slashed to pay for the war in Iraq are the LPD-17 Amphibious Lift Ship – a type that was used extensively in the post Katrina operations in New Orleans and an entire list of other critical equipment needed to maintain the total U.S. military capability.

Secretary Rusted has presided over the decline of the U.S. Navy as few Secretaries have. The size of the Navy fleet has dropped from 341 ships to 289 ships while he has been Secretary and those who raise the specter and issue of the “Clinton Cuts” fail to explain how this Administration and this Secretary have cut far more forces – especially from the Navy and the Air Force than the previous Administration even contemplated. Perhaps most troubling is the recent Pentagon announcement of a further reduction in the number of vital Aircraft Carriers from 12 to 11.

There is a loud and growing call for Secretary Rumsfeld to be fired as he has fired so many leading military officers during the course of this tenure. Senator John McCain said he had no confidence in the defense Secretary and told the Associated Press “There are very strong differences of opinion between myself and Secretary Rumsfeld” on the issue of troop strength. Senator Trent Lott, the former Senate Majority Leader, joins many Republicans and while not asking for Rumsfeld’s resignation, he clearly stated that “I’m not a fan of Secretary Rumsfeld”, at the Biloxi Chamber of Commerce according to the AP.

William Kristol, one of the founding neo-conservatives in Washington, and son of the neo conservative scion and who is also currently the editor of the Weekly Standard wrote in the Washington Post “These soldiers deserve a better Secretary than the one we have.” (The Defense Secretary We Have From the December 15th, 2004 Washington Post.)

It is time for Secretary Rumsfeld to be gone, but it must be done with a full recognition that while he has presided over one of the most failed Pentagons, the real blame and accountability for these failures lays at the feet of the Commander in Chief. At no time in history has a Commander in Chief done so little for so many who need so much and while he is exceptionally comfortable standing in front of the troops, it is now high time that we find a Secretary of Defense who is willing to stand behind them.

To learn more about Eric Massa and his campaign to Congress please visit his website at www.massaforcongress.com