First Person Account: WKC at the JFK Library - A Day in Three Acts
Act I: The View from the White House
by Donna Z
March 11, 2006
Caroline Kennedy opened the second day of the conference with a fine and funny introduction. Her remarks included a letter sent to President Johnson from a seven year old, self-described young Democrat, Brian Williams. Williams played the role of moderator, but was quick to remind us, that he is now an avowed independent.
A film of a taped interview with President Carter reminded us of his leadership in taking on the controversial position when he granted “draft dodgers” amnesty. He made a point that this amnesty did not include deserters, just, as he said, those who voted with their feet. My notes which are fuzzy at this point read: Iraq: a lamentable sequel.
With what could be thought of as the introductions over, the morning began with Ted Sorenson, Jack Valenti, Henry Kissinger, and General Haig. Each made a few memorable comments.
Sorenson, a witty, dignified man, surprised me with his statement that the Kennedy Foreign Policy included Cuba, the USSR, Berlin, and the U.N., but Vietnam remained under the radar. How strange that a war that lasted so long with such a lasting impact on the nation’s psyche should go undetected by a WHouse deservedly is thought of as a “brain trust.” Sorenson brought the audience a chuckle with his claim after his opening remarks that Kennedy had a better speech writer than does.
Jack Valenti still spry, and certainly in possession of one of those “steel-trap” minds, was full of stories of LBJ. A point he emphasized was how Johnson insisted upon keeping the Kennedy team in place. He said that the first night of Johnson’s presidency, after that “act of senseless malice” (Sorensen) the new president talked of fulfilling Kennedy’s goals and never mentioned Vietnam. Valenti was of the opinion that keeping Kennedy’s team was a bad idea from which sprung the notion that of Vietnam “we can do this on the cheap.” He made the points that “no president can win without public support and that you cannot win against an insurgency when that insurgency springs from the public culture. Adding that 60-70% of the forecasting was wrong, he concludes that “No one in Hollywood knows anything; no one in Washington knows anything; no one knows anything.” Finally my notes record that Valenti admitted “mistakes were made,” with one of the gravest being the idea that we could have the “Great Society” and fight Vietnam without adequate resources. It comes down to guns and butter.
Kissinger is aging. He refuted that Vietnam would have turned out the same had we left earlier. His point was that during the time that the war raged on, geopolitical changes in the surrounding countries and thus, tempered the ultimate fall of Saigon. He said that he believed that the president’s (I assume he meant Nixon) motives were noble motives and that it was a correct judgment to apply a theory of containment. One thing I found interesting was his statement that: “serious people make serious decisions should be taken for granted.” Oh...oh...and he said that he has no regrets. None.
General Haig was classic Haig. He is of the opinion that the Christmas bombing resulted in movement at the Paris Peace Conference, and that sustained massive bombing for an additional four months would have produced a different outcome in Vietnam. (personal note: I’ve seen/heard this statement batted around, but I remember this as contradicting some of his earlier statements. I wish I’d written faster.) General Haig said that the human toll of Agent Orange was not intentional. He also took on our present situation by pronouncing the real problem in Washington is a lack of legislators of higher standing.
This act set the stage for later panels, but of them all, I found this one to be the most divided about world views generally, and Vietnam specifically.
