Statement of General Wesley K. Clark
House Armed Services Committee hearing
April 6, 2005
Extemporaneous Remarks
Thank you Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton and distinguished members of the Committee, I submitted a statement and asked that that be put into the record and with your concurrence, I'll just make a few summary remarks here in opening.
First I want to say how grateful I am to this committee for the support that you give to the men and women in uniform and to their families. I was a beneficiary of that support during the time that I was in service. It's absolutely vital and the leaders, especially of the armed forces know how important your role is. I just have to thank you for that. I also want to commend the men and women in uniform. You can't normally do this when you testify as a general in front of the Armed Services Committee because you're one of them, but our men and women in uniform, especially in Iraq, have performed the most incredible feats of courage and bravery and innovation and adaptability on the battlefield. They've gone beyond -- far beyond -- anything they were trained to do. They've taken the ability on a high intensity environment and used those skills to operate in a very difficult and very different environment in Iraq and we should be incredibly proud of them and grateful to them. I just really admire them, from top to bottom they've done wonderfully.
In September 2002, you all invited me to testify here, I came with Richard Perle, and we talked about the upcoming Congressional resolution on the war with Iraq. I've given some thoughts on that in my opening statement, but essentially--at the time--I did warn that what we needed was a strong Congressional resolution. That we didn't need to authorize the use of force, that we had to, instead, express an intent to use force if the UN didn't work. That we needed time to build a diplomatic process, build our coalition and figure out what happened once the troops were successful. I warned that the Iraqi regime could collapse in as little as two weeks once we began the assault and we had to be prepared for what happened next.
Unfortunately, the momentum of the process and for whatever the reason, we moved in there, we didn't have the diplomatic support, we didn't have the coalition, and we didn't have the planning for what happened after we got to Bagdad. So the first year, from 2003 to 2004, is now history. We know the mistakes on the ground in Iraq, the disestablishment of the Iraqi armed forces, the outlawing of the Baath Party and many other factors, including the inability to form a common structure between the military and political leadership that the US provided, the Coalition Authority, which complicated the mission. But beyond that, I think we have to recognize that there's some other issues here associated with Iraq.
The real problem that we had two and a half years ago, was how to deal with Saddam Hussein without compromising our other security interests -- the threat of North Korea, the Iranian effort to gain nuclear weapons. But the truth is, we did focus on Iraq. North Korea then moved past the red lines that had been established, they have reprocessed, according to the intelligence, they have reprocessed the fissile material that was in the spent uranium fuel rods, presumably they have the capacity to have produced 6-8 more nuclear weapons than they had, and that is a nuclear weapon development program that has continued uncapped.
Over two and a half years ago, we were worried about the Iranian nuclear potential, but Iran is still working, they're in negotiations and most of us who spent our lives in diplomacy and strategy understand that negotiations on the part of the Iranians, they could be sincere, they could also be hedging. And they don't know exactly what the outcome's going to be, but we have to assume that they are moving forward with a nuclear program in some fashion, even as they continue to talk. So we've got to be aware of the wider aspect of the mission in Iraq.
In addition, the mission in Iraq has been complicated by factors other than an exclusive focus on success in Iraq. Apparently, the operations to destablize Iraq were viewed as the start of a broader campaign to destablize or overthrow a number of governments in the Middle East, including Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Libya, and Sudan. Libya has now renounced its threat, it's been welcomed back into the community. Syrian forces are pulling out of Lebanon, but, we're not quite sure what the overall strategy of the Administration was at the time and even today in terms of the larger picture in the region. Now we know the Administration is pressing for democracy, but what this means is, that our forces inside Iraq have had to carry an additional burden because US diplomacy in the region did not work with regional governments the way it could've to assure them that the mission in Iraq was not a threat to them. Instead, they had to view that our success in Iraq meant that they were next on the chopping block. Whether that's right or wrong is a strategic call at the national level, but it did impact on our men and women in uniform in Iraq.
Now, what to do to succeed in Iraq? A three part mission:
So on the first track, I think the US military has to shift away from the battlefield. It's got to move more into a reserve role. It's got to increasingly have a cadre of US advisors to strengthen the newly minted Iraqi forces and this is the direction we seem to be moving in. It does entail risks because as we turn over combat responsibilities, we've got to pace the turnover, not only to the strength of the Iraqi security forces, but to the suppression of the insurgency and we've got to have an advisory structure in place. I compliment General Abizad and General Casey. They are moving in this direction and thus far I think that it shows some signs of working.
On the second track, our embassies obviously play a behind-the-scenes role, and it's got a continuing role to play in helping the Iraqis form a government. We don' want to usurp Iraqi responsibilities, but we've got to be able to do, I think, more than we've done to gain local political information, to shape alternatives and facilitate the emergence of democratic governance inside Iraq. For the first 15 months of the mission, very little was accomplished. Since John Negroponte has arrived and George Casey came in to take over and they built a strong relationship, we've moved a long way. I'm hopeful that that progress will continue, but it's too soon to make a definitive cal, there are a number of key issues that remain to be resolved inside the Iraqi political system.
And on the third track, I think we have to be talking to all of Iraq's neighbors, including Syria and Iran, in a regional framework. Delaying this until we change governments in Damacus and Tehran -- which seems to be the current policy -- puts increasing pressure on our troops and raises the risks inside Iraq.
Truth is, to answer Mr.... Congressman Skelton's issue about the US armed forces.... we're caught with an overly extended ground campaign that is rapidly using up our ground combat strength from the Army and Marine Corps. Just look at it in equipment terms.
One year on the ground in Iraq for our equipment, is 5 years wear-and-tear on the equipment. We didn't budget, plan, prepare or size the structure of the force to put up with that kind of maintenance backlog. Moreover, when we went to the reserve components, we cross leveled a lot of equipment and much of that equipment is being left in Iraq. So when the reserves come home, they can't immediately begin training and preparing for their next deployment. They don't have the equipment. So we have a substantial material bill there to pay.
But more important are the human costs. We built an all-volunteer force with the Guard and the Reserve integral to that force. We did assume that if we went to war, we would always call up the Guard and Reserve. So that was the lesson of Vietnam. Well, we've done it here. And the Guard and Reserve have performed magnificently. But we have a force commitment in Iraq which cannot be sustained by the size of force that we have today. Seventeen brigades on the ground in Iraq cannot be sustained by a 33 brigade active force even with the Reserve callup that we've had. We've got to increase the size of the active force. Moreover, if we're going to retain our reserve structure, we've got to do much more for our Reservists, our Guardsmen and especially for our veterans.
As one general put it to me, he said, "You know, sir, the United States Army is fully mobilized and going at this war, but the American people aren't. They're not behind this way in the way the Army is." And so, our veterans, our Reservists, our Guardsmen are suffering as a result. We've got homeless veterans, we've got people who are being shoved off active duty, we've got inadequate transition time, we've got enornous problems building with our Veterans Administration and for our Reserve component force. And I think it's incumbent upon this committee to take the lead in dealing with those issues. We simply need to augment the size of the active force substantially, we need to fully fund our materiel requirements, we need to enhance the benefits and support of the Reserve force and as a pragmatic and moral imperative, we need to fully fund the Veterans Administration and improve our support structure for veterans.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to take your questions.
Statement of Record
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. From moment one, this Committee has been strongly supportive of the men and women in uniform, and I want to commend you for that -- and thank you for the support that so many of you gave to me during my time in the military. As a former soldier, I can’t stress enough how important these deliberations are to our armed forces and military families stationed around the world -- and to the thousands of veterans I’ve met with over the past two years. I have also heard from thousands of people over the internet who wish to express their gratitude for your efforts and concerns about the situation in Iraq. On their behalf and on behalf of my own family, I thank you.
It is a privilege to appear today to present my thoughts on Iraq and our armed forces, to offer a brief retrospective on the mission there, to sketch out a successful way ahead, and to discuss the implications for the U.S. armed forces.
In September 2002, you invited me to testify about the looming crisis in Iraq. At the time, based on the information provided by the U.S. intelligence community, we all believed that Iraq possessed some chemical and biological weapons, and had an ongoing effort to gain nuclear weapons. It made sense at the time to go to the United Nations and get strong diplomatic reinforcement to end Saddam’s weapons programs.
But the critical issue then was how to end Saddam’s weapons program without detracting from our focus on Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network, and our efforts to deal with other immediate, mid- and long-term security problems. As you may recall, I counseled at the time that we needed a Congressional Resolution -- not at that point authorizing the use of force -- but rather expressing the intent to use force if all other measures were to fail. I testified that we should then use this Congressional Resolution to press for UN action, that we should work patiently to forge world-wide legitimacy, and that force should be used only as a last resort, after all diplomatic means had been exhausted -- and then only after we had fully prepared to handle the post-conflict process in Iraq.
After a Congressional Resolution and an aborted U.N. inspection effort, the U.S. invaded Iraq. We did not use the U.N. process effectively to enhance our legitimacy or build our coalition. The Administration did not heed the warnings of General Shinseki and others who warned of the force strength necessary to win the war and win the peace. In short, the Administration did not give our military adequate planning or sufficient resources to handle the post-conflict situation in Iraq. These errors were compounded by weak strategic decisions, including dissolving the Iraqi army and outlawing Baathist participation in new governmental structures. The prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib has provided our enemies with a propaganda bonanza resulting in a recruiting windfall in Iraq and throughout the Arab world.
More fundamentally, with its armed occupation of Iraq, the Administration lost focus, and was substantially distracted from worldwide efforts against Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network are still at large, terrorist incidents have continued to take innocent life, and U.S. military actions in Iraq have provided a magnet for recruiting and training large numbers of extremist youth in continuing warfare. If Iraq is today the center of the war against terrorism, as some in the Administration have contended, it is not because the terrorists were there originally, but because they have been recruited there to the fight against us. Our military action in Iraq is more a catalyst for terrorists than a cure. Whatever results may ultimately come from removing Saddam Hussein from power, ending the terrorist threat against the United States of America is not likely to be one of them.
Of great concern today and, frankly, in the years ahead is that the focus on Iraq has deprived the Administration of the time, diplomatic support, and military resources to act effectively against other, more dangerous sources of WMD proliferation. The “red line” established by the Clinton Administration against North Korea’s reprocessing of spent uranium fuel to make plutonium has now been breached. North Korea has announced that they have reprocessed and presumably now have the fissile materials to make at least a half dozen additional nuclear weapons. Furthermore, this Administration has refused to participate in the discussions aimed at persuading Iran to permanently renounce its uranium enrichment capabilities.
From the outset, the military mission in Iraq has been complicated by factors other than making the best decisions for success. Operations to destabilize Iraq were apparently viewed as the start of a broader campaign to destabilize or overthrow a number of governments in the Middle East, including Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Libya, and Sudan. The start of the campaign was rushed, for reasons that have never been made clear by the Administration. And once U.S. forces were inside Iraq, U.S. diplomacy failed to take measures to undercut regional resistance from countries such as Syria and Iran.
If we are to succeed in Iraq, we must move along three tracks; first, improve security and at the same time reduce the exposure and commitment of the U.S. forces; second, strengthen our ability to facilitate Iraqi political development; third, we must reduce regional resistance to the emergence of a democratic Iraq.
On the first track, the U.S. military must shift away from the battlefields and move into more of a reserve role, relying on a cadre of U.S. advisors to strengthen the newly-minted Iraqi forces. This will entail risks, as U.S. forces turn over combat responsibilities, so it must be paced to improved Iraqi capabilities and the development of an advisory structure.
On the second track, our Embassy obviously has to play a behind-the-scenes role. Without usurping Iraqi responsibilities, we should be able to do more to gain local political information, shape alternatives and facilitate the emergence of democratic governance inside Iraq
On the third track, we should to be talking to all of Iraq’s neighbors, including Syria and Iran in a regional framework. Delaying this until we can change the governments in Damascus and Tehran, which seems to be the current policy, puts increasing pressure on our troops and raises the risks inside Iraq.
The U.S. armed forces are caught up in an over-extended ground campaign that is rapidly using up our ground combat strength. In equipment terms, each year in Iraq puts about five years of normal wear-and-tear on the equipment. The wheeled and tracked fleets from the first combat rotation into Iraq have not yet been fully repaired and restored. Reserve component units are leaving much of their equipment behind in Iraq for follow-on units, thereby crippling their recovery and retraining at home
Even more importantly, the human costs to the all-volunteer Army, especially, have been staggering. The Army currently has 17 brigades deployed in Iraq, from an active force of 33 brigades, which should grow to 44 brigades as the result of internal Army restructuring. Most reserve component brigades have already been called up and deployed. The result is that active duty soldiers can expect to be deployed every other year to Iraq for a year long combat tour, unless either the size of the American commitment to Iraq is reduced or the size of the active force is significantly increased.
And even maintaining the force at its current size is likely to be challenging. While the active force is meeting its retention objectives, recruiting for the Army and Marine Corps is lagging behind both for the active and the reserve component. Ultimately, if the current combat levels in Iraq continue, this recruiting gap is unlikely to be closed by more financial incentives. Most married soldiers just can’t contemplate indefinitely deploying for a year, every other year, away from their families.
Even worse is the treatment that the United States is meting out to its returning reservists, Guardsmen, and other veterans. Over the past three years there has been a substantial erosion of veterans benefits -- hospitals have closed or reduced treatments, usage fees have risen, returning reservists and Guardsmen have lost jobs, had their homes foreclosed on, credit scores ruined, suffered family tragedies, and significant stresses. The adjustment mechanisms to receive home our soldiers and then to sustain them and care for them as a grateful nation should are simply inadequately developed and funded. We owe our veterans -- and we owe their families as a pragmatic matter, if we don’t do more, we’ll never be able to raise the forces we need to sustain our commitments.
If we are to sustain the all-volunteer force, and restore our defenses, we will need to augment the size of the active force substantially, fully fund our materiel requirements, enhance the benefits and support for our reserve force, and as both a pragmatic and moral imperative, fully fund the VA and improve our support structure for our veterans.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you again for your support of our troops. I will be pleased to take your questions.