Playing Games With Kosovo

Moscow sees Serbia as its final bulwark in the Balkans against the steady advance of the West.

By Wesley K. Clark | Newsweek International
Updated: 11:34 AM ET Feb 23, 2008

Almost nine years after NATO's bombing campaign ended the Serbian ethnic cleansing of Kosovo's Albanian majority, Kosovo has finally declared its independence. It was immediately recognized by the United States, Britain and a number of other countries. But Russia, following Serbia's lead, has ostentatiously advertised its anger at the move. The shouting from Moscow continues, with Putin vigorously protesting and threatening to recognize separatist elements elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

Why all the fuss? The anger of Serbian nationalists who burned the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade is easy enough to understand: they don't want to give up what they see as the touchstone of their national identity, the Field of Blackbirds in Kosovo, where Serb fighters were roundly defeated by invading Turks in 1389. But why should Russia care so much about a remote and tiny province? Most explanations have hinged on the precedent this sets for secessionist populations throughout the former Soviet Union—the Chechens in Russia, the Abkhazians and Ossetians in Georgia, separatists in Moldova. And there's something to this argument.

But Moscow isn't truly worried the Chechens will cut loose: it has been years since Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, crushed the rebellion there and installed a loyal strongman in Grozny. The real reason for Putin's intransigence is that he sees Serbia as Russia's last slice of the former Yugoslavia still in Moscow's sphere of influence—and as Russia's final bulwark in Southeast Europe against the West. There's more than just 19th-century Pan-Slavism or 21st-century Russian pride at stake here. Russia's objections reflect pure geostrategic calculus.

The Soviets saw the map of Europe as a chessboard, and to some extent the Kremlin still does. And since 1989 that game has gone very badly for Russia indeed. First, starting in 1989, came the collapse of the communist regimes in the satellite nations of Eastern Europe: East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Then, in 1991, the Soviet Union itself broke up into 11 newly independent states. Russia retained influence over the region and remained a superpower on the global stage—but barely, and only by virtue of its nuclear arsenal.

Despite the positive changes that followed, such as the democratizing of Russia and the liberalization of its economy, it was a time of deep humiliation. As one high-ranking Russian officer asked me at the first U.S.-Russian Joint Staff talks in 1994, "When will your NATO ships be in our port of Riga?" Of course, by then it wasn't their port at all; Latvia had already declared its independence. And by 2004, Latvia—along with the other Baltic states of Lithuania and Estonia—had become a proud member of NATO.

More at Newsweek International

General Wesley Clark on MSNBC News Live

June 25, 2007
transcript by Reg NYC

Contessa Brewer: Hamid Karzai is warning U.S. and NATO forces that Afghan life is not cheap. Allied forces are taking on Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, but they're increasingly killing innocent civilians. And that's the finding from an Associated Press report. Of course, the fallout is raising the level of anger at the U.S. and NATO from Afghans. MSNBC analyst and former NATO Commander General Wesley Clark joins me now. General, great to see you today.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Nice to be with you Contessa.

Contessa Brewer: So, according to the Associated Press, while Taliban militants killed 178 Afghan civilians this year, Western forces killed 203. In your opinion, is Karzai right? Are Western forces being careful enough not to target civilians?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, Karzai's reflecting opinion in Afghanistan, as he must. And I think this is a very important public warning to the NATO Commanders that they must change the rules that they're following in bringing in close air support. Of course we want to do everything to protect our troops there, but to win this war you can't alienate the people of Afghanistan. I think Karzai and NATO are certainly on the same side in this. Obviously, our Commanders don't want to kill innocent people. It does happen, and it's a matter of tightening up on the rules to reduce its occurrence.

General Wesley Clark on Fox & Friends First

November 28, 2006
Transcript by RegNYC

Brian Kilmeade: Now, the guy who's saying we should've been talked to Syria and Iran a long time ago joins us now, and he's, he's a Fox News contributor, and he's got tremendous credentials.

Tiki Barber: Yes. Former NATO Allied Commander and Fox News analyst, General Wesley Clark joins us from Providence, Rhode Island. Welcome to the show this morning, Pres-

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Thank you.

Tiki Barber: Real quickly, President Bush is going to NATO, to the NATO summit. What is he planning on asking? What can we expect from him as he heads to this summit?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: I think he's going to ask for greater contributions from NATO members to help protect President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan and that the NATO countries that are there remove restrictions on the deployments of their forces. What I hope he proposes and what I hope NATO will ask of the United States is greater leadership in creating overall strategy for success in Afghanistan, including an answer to the problem of opium production and a better economic life for people there.

General Wesley Clark on Fox's Studio B

November 26, 2006
Transcript by Melange

Trace Gallagher: It's considered the strongest military force in the world - NATO fighting the toughest war in its history in Afghanistan. What happens there seen as a critical turning point maybe, or maybe the barometer of the future of the alliance but the force is already stretched very thin, bogged down in the lawless areas in southern Afghanistan, fending off Taliban attacks almost every day and world leaders are meeting this week to talk about expanding NATO's role. General Wesley Clark is the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander and General, you almost…if NATO is going to become or maintain its dominance, its world force, Afghanistan's a must.


GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Absolutely. NATO must succeed in Afghanistan but this is not a mission that can be won simply by the application of fire power and I think NATO leaders understand this. This is a three-part problem: there's a security problem; there's an economic problem; and there's a cross-border problem. And, all three have to be dealt with by investing the Afghan people in their own defense and their own security. You've got to make them believe in themselves.

Trace Gallagher: Yeah. The President is going to go in there and say, you know the countries that are part of NATO are not doing enough - they're not spending enough money on military and therefore they're being weakened by that. Now is it…should we spend more money on military in these NATO countries or spend more money on things like intelligence and maybe homeland security?

What We Must Do Now

Success is possible. But make no mistake. We are not winning.

By Wesley K. Clark | Newsweek International

Oct. 2, 2006 - In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, U.S. forces achieved a rapid, high-tech victory over Afghanistan's terrorist-supporting Taliban government. Five years later, the Taliban is back. But this is a different fight. Not only Afghanistan but NATO itself is at risk.

Fingers are pointing. Washington didn't commit enough forces.

The Europeans are too timid. The central government is weak. All that might be true. But the real problem grows out of how the United States defined its mission to begin with. That was to strike the Taliban but not get stuck in Afghanistan. We don't do "nation-building," American leaders declared, as if that were something to be proud of. Besides, the troops would soon be needed in Iraq.

The fact is that Afghanistan was a tribal country savaged by 20 years of war and further brutalized by the fundamentalist Taliban. Its infrastructure, educational system, agriculture—all was gone. With the Taliban in retreat, traditional warlords reestablished themselves. Vital political and economic assistance never arrived. Neither did a sufficiently strong international security force. Instead, a few thousand U.S. troops were inserted to pursue the remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The government of Hamid Karzai, pieced together, was never able to extend its reach much outside Kabul. The results today are a mockery of early optimism. Despite the presence of almost 40,000 NATO troops, security has worsened. Opium has again become a major business, infrastructure redevelopment lags, schools remain closed—and across great swathes of the country the Taliban is resurgent.

In the war on terrorism, alliances are not an obstacle to victory. They're the key to it.

Reprinted with permission.

By General Wesley Clark
Washington Monthly
September, 2002

A few days after September 11, I happened to be walking the halls of the Pentagon, the scene of so many contentious meetings during my years as commander of NATO forces in Europe, and ran into an old acquaintance, now a senior official.

We chatted briefly about TV coverage of the crisis and the impending operations in Afghanistan. At his invitation, I began to share some thoughts about how we had waged the Kosovo war by working within NATO--but he cut me off. "We read your book," he scoffed. "And no one is going to tell us where we can or can't bomb."

That was exactly how the United States proceeded. Of course, the campaign in Afghanistan, as it unfolded, wasn't an all-American show. The United States sought and won help from an array of countries: basing rights in Central Asian states and in Pakistan; some shared intelligence from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Muslim states; diplomatic backing from Russia and China; air and naval support from France; naval refueling from Japan; special forces from the United Kingdom, and so on.